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Review of CGIAR Commitments in West Africa A/ 
The Study of CGIAR Commitments in West Africa, requested by TAC, was 
conducted by a Panel chaired by Mr. John McIntire. The Panel found that the present 
organization of the CGIAR’s work in West Africa is reasonably efficient and cost- 
effective and that there is no need for a major restructuring of the way the CGIAR is 
operating in West Africa. A key issue is how to incorporate the opinions of NARS into 
the formulation of Center programs. 
Following are the main issues raised by the Panel: 
0 Policy and management research: The Panel recommended that IFPRI 
should be named a strong convening Center for socio-economics, policy, 
and management research in West Africa, with greater focus on its work in 
Nigeria than at present. Both IFPRI and concerned Center Directors 
objected to this recommendation. 
0 Institution building, training, and information: The Panel recommended 
that the Centers, with the exception of ISNAR, should limit their activities 
in institution building to training and information and should abandon 
organization and management counseling because it is not their comparative 
advantage. The overall size of training and information activities should 
also be reduced. The Center Directors Committee did not share this point 
of view. 
Extract from “Summary of Proceedings and Decisions - Report from the Ad Hoc 
Evaluation Committee II”, CGIAR Mid-Term Meeting 1995, Nairobi, Kenya 
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0 Production systems versus germplasm development research: The Panel 
recommended that production systems and management research be 
devolved by IITA and ICRISAT to NARS in order to augment upstream 
work by the Centers on the conservation and management of natural 
resources and germplasm enhancement and breeding. 
0 Impact: The Panel felt that the current production impact of ICRISAT and 
ILRI in West Africa is low. Its recommendation is for a high-level review 
of ICRISAT’s crop improvement program for sorghum and a shift of 
ICRISAT’s research effort in millet improvement from the Niamey site to a 
less arid area where such management issues as inter-cropping, 
mechanization, complex cropping patterns, and rotations can be 
incorporated into millet improvement. 
0 An alternative organization: The Panel proposed a common Board of 
Trustees for WARDA and IITA with ex-officio representation of ICRISAT, 
ICRAF, and IRRI as a means of harmonizing research between the two 
institutions. 
0 Relations with partners: The contacts of Centers with national programs 
are on the whole efficient. The Centers have many mechanisms to inform 
themselves about national activities, to receive input into their research 
planning, and to collaborate substantively on common problems. 
l TAC was pleased with the experience gained and with the outcome of the 
study. It intends to proceed by undertaking a similar study in Latin 
America and subsequently in Asia and West Asia/North Africa. 
Members of Ad Hoc Committee II thanked the Panel for a thought-provoking 
report. The report’s difference from other CGIAR reviews was found to be refreshing. 
The Committee was pleased to note that the Panel found the present organization 
of the CGIAR’s work in West Africa to be reasonably efficient and cost-effective. The 
Committee also noted the Panel Chair’s assurance that the CGIAR’s investments in this 
region are productive and that no major institutional reforms are necessary. 
A number of issues identified by the Panel led to a lively dialogue between the 
Panel and the Centers operating in West Africa. These included the following: 
0 What the impact of the Centers had been on the region. 
0 How impact assessment could be enhanced. 
0 Production systems versus germplasm development research. 
0 Coordination of policy research at the regional level. 
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l Role of the Centers in institution building and training. 
0 Harmonizing governance and activities of the Centers operating in West 
Africa. 
The Committee concluded that this experiment with a regional review of CGIAR 
investments was a success, and encouraged TAC to commission reviews of other regions. 
Lessons learned from this review should be used in designing future reviews. These 
include possibly larger panels, earlier dialogue with Centers and NARS, and reports that 
are frank--where one does not need to read between the lines. 
The Committee proposed that the Group should recommend the review report for 
further consideration by Centers, NARS, donors, TAC, and other actors, and encourage 
TAC to continue experimenting with similar regional reviews for other regions. The 
Group agreed. 
CONSULTATIVE GROUP ON INTERNATIONAL AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH 
TECHNICAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE 
Donald L. Winkelmann 
Chair 
11 th April 1995 
Dear Mr. Serageldin, 
I have great pleasure to transmit to you the Report of the Study of CGIAR 
Commitments in West Africa, conducted by a Panel chaired by Dr. John M&tire (USA). 
The Panel Report and the comments of the Centre Directors’ Committee were considered 
by TAC at its 66th meeting at CIP, Lima, Peru from 13th - 24th March 1995. I should 
recall here that the proposal to undertake this study was made in TAC’s recommendations 
on Medium-Term Resource Allocation 1994-98 and in the revised Chapter 13 of the 
report on CGIAR Priorities and Strategies. 
TAC praises the Panel for a thought-provoking review and a well-written, 
analytical report. The Committee is pleased with the finding that the present organization 
of the CGIAR’s work in West Africa is reasonably efficient and cost-effective. TAC was 
also pleased to note that “the Panel strongly supports the centres’ efforts in West Africa, 
admires the significant successes that have been achieved and expects these successes to 
multiply in the future”. The Panel also makes valuable suggestions with respect to 
improvement of IARCs-NARS relations and impact assessment as well as a number of 
centre-specific recommendations. 
In addition to the Panel Report, I attach the TAC Commentary, which summarizes 
TAC Members’ reactions on some of the major issues raised in the Report. The Report 
has raised generic issues on policy research and the returns to investment in research in 
semi-arid areas which will be referred to the forthcoming stripe study on public policy 
and management research and a special study to be commissioned by TAC respectively. 
Other centre-specific issues will be addressed through the external review process. 
Mr. Ismail Serageldin 
Chair, CGIAR 
The World Bank 
1818 H Street, N.W. 
Washington, D.C. 20433 
USA. 
Mail address: 1058 Mansion Ridge Road, Santa Fe, New Mexico 87501, USA 
Tel & Fax: (l-505) 820-7248 
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TAC was pleased with the experiences gained and with the outcome of this study. 
It intends to proceed by undertaking a similar study in Latin America, and subsequently 
in Asia and West Asia/North Africa. 
I look forward to a stimulating discussion at the Mid-Term Meeting in Nairobi. 
Yours sincerely, 
Chair, TAC. 
TAC COMMENTARY ON THE STUDY 
OF CGIAR COMMITMENTS IN WEST AFRICA 
TAC is grateful to John McIntire and his colleagues for a thought-provoking 
review and a well written, analytical report. The Committee is very pleased with the 
Panel’s conclusion that the current organization of the CGIAR’s work is reasonably cost 
effective and that there is no need for major restructuring of the way the CGIAR is 
operating in West Africa. The Panel’s report has many useful suggestions and 
observations for some of the centres’ research programmes on which the Committee will 
follow up on, through the external reviews of the centres concerned. It is to be noted that 
the reviews of IITA and ICRISAT are scheduled to occur during 1995 and 1996 
respectively. 
At the request of TAC, the Panel addressed a range of issues which were beyond 
its original terms of reference. By so widening the scope, TAC has given the Panel an 
opportunity to make additional important contributions. This has stimulated discussion 
and identified a range of issues for consideration by the CGIAR. Such issues include the 
interaction between small NARS and the CGIAR Centres, particularly the ideal and 
realistic division of labour and complementarities among them in a dynamic context; the 
comparative advantages of individual Centres and IFPRI in policy research; and the 
impact of CGIAR Centres. 
TAC’s reaction to the major themes identified in the report is provided below. 
Two distinct observations and lessons emerge from the West Africa Study on process 
issues. First, because the Panel’s report covered issues other than the original terms of 
reference and reached controversial conclusions on several of them, it prompted stronger 
reaction as can be seen from the attached CDC’s comments. Second, the draft report 
presented to TAC in October 1994 was discussed in an open session, leading to its 
premature circulation to donors prior to the Panel having an opportunity to fully respond 
to the comments of affected CGIAR Centres. The Committee of Centre Directors has. 
expressed a concern at this procedure and TAC concurs, that circulation of the earlier 
draft might have given a less favourable picture of the Centres’ work and impact than is 
warranted, particularly in view of the revisions made by the Panel in the report in 
response to Centre Directors’ comments, and the fact that several centre programmes 
were in any case changing in line with what the Panel is now recommending. There is an 
important lesson to be learned regarding the sequence of the process of consultations and 
subsequent revisions given the synergetic review process.. 
TAC’s commentary below focuses on only a few important issues covered by the 
Panel. 
Policy Research 
The Panel recommends that IFPRI should be named as a strong convening centre 
for socioeconomics, policy and management research in West Africa with a greater focus 
of IFPRI’s work in Nigeria than hithertofore. This is in order to integrate the 
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micro-economics focus of the commodity Centres with its own policy focus, and to 
provide leadership to the policy work. 
Both IFPRI and concerned Centre Directors have objected to this recommendation 
on grounds of logistics, replicability of likely impact of CGIAR’s policy research in 
Nigeria to other countries, and impact vis-a-vis that of other actors, for example, the 
World Bank. TAC recognized that while IFPRI may have a strong track record in policy 
research, this does not provide it with the natural leadership in other aress of social 
science and management research. Furthermore, TAC’s forthcoming stripe study on 
policy research will address this issue in a more generic way, for example, the 
relationship of IFPRI with commodity centres in policy research and may reconsider this 
recommendation in the light of the findings of the stripe study. 
Production Systems versus Germplasm Development Research 
The Panel recommends that Activity Category 3 (Production Systems and 
Management Research) be devolved by IITA and ICRISAT to the NARS in order to 
augment upstream work by Centres in Categories 1 (Conservation and Management of 
Natural Resources) and 2 (Germplasm Enhancement and Breeding). The report also 
emphasizes strategic and process-oriented research in the IARCs in Category 3, and 
devolution of site-specific production systems to strong NARS through long-term joint 
programmes. It argues that the work of the IARCs should be more strategic, for 
example, on the development of computer models of multiple cropping and soil-water 
interactions, etc. 
ICRISAT, ILRI and IITA are already devolving a substantial share of their applied 
research work to national research systems which is congruent with the Panel’s 
recommendation. However, other recommendations, particularly with regard to the 
extent to which even strong NARS can take over most of the production systems and 
management research, remain contentious in view of the generally poor funding of the 
NARS in West Africa. For example, TAC does not believe that outright devolution will 
be appropriate under existing circumstances. Strengthening of partnerships between the 
Centres and NARS in the subregion will inevitably result in a shift towards the more 
strategic spectrum of production research by centres. TAC also notes that in recent years 
major efforts have been made to strengthen the organization of national research to a 
regional perspective e.g. through SPAAR and CORAF. These efforts merit full support 
and may lead to further opportunities to devolve current CGIAR activities to national 
agencies. 
Research in Semi-Arid Areas 
The Panel has recommended: (a) a high-level review of ICRISAT’s crop 
improvement programrne in West Africa, including that of CIRAD’s programme for 
sorghum; (b) shift of ICRISAT’s research effort in millet improvement from the Niamey 
site to a less arid area where such management issues as inter-cropping, mechanization, 
complex cropping patterns, and rotations can be incorporated into millet improvement. 
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TAC considers that, to the extent such changes are not already in process, these 
issues should be explored further both in the forthcoming review of ICRISAT, the cereals 
study, and the ecoregional initiative on the desert margins. 
A Common IITA and WARDA Board 
The Panel proposes a common Board of Trustees for WARDA and IITA with 
ex-officio representation of ICRISAT, ICRAF, and IRRI as means of harmonizing 
research between the two institutions. 
Harmonization of boards by ensuring a few common board members is a direction 
in which CGIAR Centres are moving to increase inter-centre coordination of research, for 
example, between CIFOR and ICRAF. Yet there is no consensus in TAC that a fully 
common board will be either feasible or effective in harmonizing the research 
prograrnmes. Cross-representation at programme committee level is a possibility which 
should be examined by the IITA review. It is therefore an issue which will be addressed 
by TAC again in the near future. 
Irrigation and Water Management 
The Panel expresses caution with respect to future work on irrigation and water 
management in West Africa. Many of what seem to be technical or social research 
questions are in fact problems of public policy for irrigation and water management. 
TAC notes that West African governments have tended to opt for large-scale 
surface irrigation projects. While there is also considerable scope for the transfer of 
simpler, small-scale technologies, to Africa, from the viewpoint of employment, income 
generation, rates of return, etc, TAC believes that future policy work by others, and 
perhaps the CGIAR, for example on investment policies with regard to irrigation in West 
Africa, is needed. 
March 2, 1995 




Via delle Terme di Caracalle 
Rome 00100, Italy 
TAC 66: REPORT OF THE PANEL OF THE CGIAR COMMITMENTS IN WEST 
AFRICA 
Dear Mr. Winkelmann: 
The earlier draft of this report was discussed by Center Directors with TAC during the 
joint meeting in Washington in October of 1994. The CDC requested that we be given a 
chance for a full review. In Washington it was accepted that CDC comments were to be 
sent to the authors. Furthermore, it was agreed that the Center Director comments would 
be attached as an annex to the final report. Finally, the hope was expressed that the draft 
report would not be widely circulated, as it may mislead readers. 
The Center Directors submitted individual as well as combined comments to the authors, 
the latter are attached to this letter in their unedited form. Mr. McIntire refers at length 
to them in his letter of submission to you. In some cases he accepted our comments, in 
other he rejected them, or dealt with them only partially. 
Unfortunately, time is now too short to request all Center Directors to review the 
“finalized” TAC paper and forward you their individual detailed or any CDC combined 
comments. There are a number of statements in the final report to which some of my 
colleagues would disagree. At this time I will make only the following major points on 
the report as it stands now: 
1. Many conclusions reached by the authors lack supporting evidence. (Why would 
regional coordination in the social sciences be more appropriate in West Africa 
than in the other regions?) Others are generalizations and might be applicable in 
some instances, but certainly not for all countries or for all centers. 
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Headquarters Correspondence 
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2. Natural scientists and agriculturists would disagree with some of the emphasis 
given or conclusions reached in the report. (For example: hybrid seed under 
local conditions of production might not be superior in many countries; they 
require inter alia appropriate national policies, adequate institutional support, 
assured provision of various inputs, and a strong national seed industry.) 
3. The recommendation to reduce the work on production systems and “resource 
management” research not only contradicts the proposed ecoregional approach 
and the future emphasis on natural resource management, but is a hasty 
conclusion in light of the limited time and resources so far invested in the many 
existing as well as potentially viable production systems in West Africa. 
Furthermore, most national programs lack the. human and the financial resources 
to absorb this important work. 
4. The report still does not do justice to the manifold aspects and intricacies of 
institution building. The resources for the latter cannot and should not be 
reduced. There is considerably more to institution building than general training 
and information 
5. The report misinterprets and does not do justice of many aspects and problems of 
small NABS. While small NABS are generally weak, not all weak NABS in 
West Africa are small. For the small NABS the report proposes more training, 
with the assumption that the trained manpower can then be absorbed by the 
government. The government should then also be able to provide the necessary 
financial and physical resources for effective and efficient research. 
In conclusion, while the report makes a valuable contribution to the discussion about the 
different problems in agricultural research and development in West Africa, it is 
insufficient to guide decisions on the future commitments of the CGIAR in that region. 
Further comments could, of course, be provided by Center Directors, should this be 
requested by TAC. 
Finally, we propose that as the next step the report be discussed with the NABS leaders 
of the countries covered, in order to underline the role of our partners in such important 
subjects. 
With best regards, 
C. Bonte-Friedheim 
Chair, 
Center Directors Committee 
cc: Guido Gryseels, Deputy Executive Secretary TAC 
Encl. 
Report of the Panel on 
CGIAR Commitments in West Africa 
Comments by Centre Directors Committee 
1. The Panel has addressed an extensive task in a relative short time. While the 
Centre Directors Committee has reservations on some of the recommendations, it wishes 
to acknowledge the large amount of very useful information gathered, and the many 
constructive recommendations made by the Panel. 
2. The chapter on the economies of West Africa provides an excellent description of 
the economic, structural, environmental, and technical constraints that any agricultural 
research organizations faces in this region. 
3. The Panel’s review of research institutions clearly shows the difficulties the NARS 
are facing. However, it does not adequately address the opportunities for assisting the 
small NARS. For example, the Panel notes: “But where national institutions are so 
weak as to be almost completely ineffective, as is the case of practically all countries in 
this group (small countries), then the only practical solution is to have a focused bilateral 
project, tied to a foreign university because of the importance of adequate academic 
training in developing national capacity, that seeks to create a core national institution.” 
This statement ignores the excellent cooperation between Centres and all NARS in the 
region, including the small ones, through a large variety of formal and informal linkages 
between the Centres, other research institutions, and the NARS. 
4. The statement also goes against ISNAR’s findings on the small countries’ research 
programmes. Small countries need a flexible research system, closely linked to national 
policymakers, which can scan a wide range of external sources to match technologies to 
national demands, and give advice to farmers and policymakers. Tying a NARS to a 
single donor agency or a foreign university does not build a flexible system, it does not 
strengthen the link to national policy, and it does not encourage NARS to scan widely. and 
use innovative linkage mechanisms. Unfortunately, many small NARS in West Africa 
have fallen into dependency on a single donor or university. The results are not 
promising. There is a loss of institutional identity, and a tendency for researchers to see 
themselves as employees of the donor agency as opposed to the national system. There 
are problems of parallel management between donor technical assistance teams and 
national counterparts, and a feeling of loss of autonomy. 
5. The Panel expects that CGIAR commitments in the region will stay high, and it 
gives various reasons for this. It does not see significant areas of overlap in the ongoing 
CGIAR activities. While this may be correct, it is somewhat surprising that mainly 
financial arguments are used for these conclusions. Alternatively, emphasis on matters 
such as the need for working together as a system and streamlining the relationships with 
NARS might have led to the development of -recommendations for more common 
approaches in the future. In West Africa, the Centres are continuously working on these 
relationships. 
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6. The Panel notes that Nigeria has absorbed 56% of IARC resources in West Africa. 
However, as the Panel acknowledges, the IARCs are not bilateral research aid 
organizations. Centres have established programmes at locations in Nigeria judged to be 
the best for conducting ecoregional research in the humid and subhumid zones of West 
Africa, not to favour Nigeria. Elsewhere in the report, the Panel itself uses the 
representativeness and extent of these zones in Nigeria, and the opportunities to draw on 
collaboration of NARS and extension services, as arguments to support its 
recommendation that two IFPRI staff be located in Nigeria. 
7. The report draws a number of conclusions with respect to administrative costs. It 
shows the complexity of the matter, and the difficulty of comparing costs as presented by 
the various Centres. Any Centre that works in the region will have administrative costs. 
The report states: “Another assertion is that administration costs are higher than those of 
like institutions in the industrialized countries.” In fact, however, the percentage 
overhead costs of the Centres are about half that charged by institutions in industrialized 
countries. A more detailed and accurate analysis of overhead costs is needed before firm 
conclusions can be stated. 
8. The suggestion in the Panel’s report that resources to be shifted from research on 
production systems and management to germplasm enhancement and breeding and that the 
African centres pull back to little more than breeding is untenable. It also demonstrates a 
failure to understand and put to work the lessons that some 30 years of agricultural R&D 
have provided. Although strategic breeding is indeed a great strength of many Centres in 
Africa, its potential benefits depend heavily on other critical aspects of agricultural R&D. 
9. For example, for obvious reasons, crop varieties that require significant amounts 
of costly and often-unavailable external inputs are not likely to assist the majority of 
women and men farmers in Africa. And even where such inputs are affordable and 
available, there may be, for example, serious environmental and human health 
implications linked with the use of agrochemicals. Thus crop varieties must be 
configured to work in tandem with low-external-input and environmentally friendly 
complements: on the one hand, things like new techniques of seedbed preparation, plant 
spacing, weed control, soil management, cornposting, water harvesting, and so forth; and 
on the other, technologies like biological control and IPM. 
10. To develop such environmentally and socioeconomically appropriate ‘packages’, 
research is required in these other domains of agricultural R&D, just as much as in 
breeding. Otherwise, the breeding effort will be vitiated. In any case, as breeders 
themselves will readily agree, it is extremely difficult to include every desired trait in 
every variety. New varieties will generally need to be accompanied by other elements of 
production improvement. 
11. Many researchable questions are obviously best addressed by agricultural 
disciplines other than plant genetics alone. Such questions must be answered before 
embarking upon a breeding initiative, so as to guide and target breeding efforts in an 
efficient way. Leaving these questions solely to the NARS, as the stripe report would 
seem to urge, opens up the possibility of poorly directed breeding efforts in which a great 
deal of scarce scientific, human and financial resources could be squandered. 
xvii 
12. This is not to say that NARS should not do the work of fitting varieties into 
specific farming systems. Quite the contrary. It is to say, however, that if Centres 
forego research in these other critical areas of the R&D enterprise, their breeding work 
likely to suffer in terms of ultimate impact. Neither would Centres then have the basic 
knowledge or capacity to advise and assist NARS in their efforts to further develop 
varieties for local use. Centres would be left in the position of just ‘guessing’ and 
releasing varieties and hoping for the best. 
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13. The Panel has made its recommendation on the shift in resources based on the 
perceived limited impact of centre research on production systems and management 
compared to the impact of crop improvement research. It did not, however, present 
specific criteria on how such impact should be measured, either in terms of better 
understanding of the complex production systems, or in terms of significant changes and 
improvement in production practices. Such evaluations should, for example, take into 
account the different timeframes over which changes may reasonably be expected . 
14. The Panel’s recommendation that the process of devolution should be assisted by 
Centres with funding from their own core budgets, with appropriate reallocations from 
category 3, completely ignores the limited resources available to the IARCs and the 
inappropriateness of using these funds as if IARCs are donors. Contrarily, the Panel in 
its commentary on institution building argues the IARCs have no role there. With the 
example of the ‘Second Agricultural Research Project in Senegal’, the Panel correctly 
notes that the IARCs have no comparative advantage in institution building, which 
requires greater resources, a wider perspective, and political reforms that they cannot 
effect. 
15. The CG system is now embarking on ecoregional approaches, in which both 
sustainable resource management and improved productivity research needs will be 
addressed together with various partners, in particular the NARS. In these new 
cooperative efforts, the CG system should make full use of production systems and 
management research results achieved so far and also assist in identifying additional 
research needs. 
16. There are hardly any references to water in the entire text, which is strange 
considering that the Sudano-Sahelian zones have very adverse water/people ratios. 
Irrigation is dismissed in a few sentences, the conclusion being that “irrigated 
agriculture.. . is not usually economic.” There is no consideration as to whether 
cost-reduction might be an appropriate objective for a management approach, or whether 
the recent devaluation of the CFA franc might alter the economics in countries of 
francophone West Africa. The report also appears to discount the strong interest shown 
by governments in exploring fully the possibility of applying irrigation to their food 
security needs. 
17. The report defines the scope of activities linked to institution building too 
narrowly, to include only training and information. Direct institution building benefits 
that can be derived from regional networking include: (1) experience in priority setting, 
development of sound research projects, resource allocation/management, and reporting; 
(2) improved awareness of and access to new research methodologies, results, and 
. . . 
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technologies; (3) reallocation of natural resources to activities in which institutions have 
a regional comparative advantage; and (4) improved morale of national scientists by 
working with regional disciplinary peers. In these discussions, the activities of IIMI with 
respect to improving the capabilities of NARS to manage irrigation systems should have 
been mentioned. 
18. The authors of the report do recognize that there is more to institutional 
development than training and information, but they suggest that it should be done by 
institutions such as university consortia and consultants rather than IARCs. While it is 
true that commodity oriented centres have no comparative advantage in institutional 
development in general, they can make a valuable contribution (with ISNAR), to 
strengthening the quality of research through better research planning and improved 
research methods, etc. Station development, which in the report is suggested as the 
single contribution of ISNAR to the region, should also be done in conjunction with 
Centres across the region. It would make sense that such training take place on research 
sites. 
19. The Panel concludes that the root cause for institutional weakness of the NARS is 
their flimsy political commitment to research and extension. But the lack of policy 
commitment alone cannot explain the poor performance of West African NARS. The 
post colonial experience of many countries in the region is fairly limited and the 
management tradition of research institutions has not been effectively replaced. There 
were few national scientists in colonial research organizations who could carry over a 
management tradition for effective research organizations. NARS of the colonial period, 
and of the post colonial period in some cases, functioned very much as developed country 
institutions; they did not experience serious financial difficulties, and their staff was 
recruited from a much wider resource pool than is available to present day NARS. Their 
incentives were substantial and promotion mechanisms were clear and operational. They 
did not have to cope with the difficulties of managing pools of equipment provided by 
several donors, with their own purchasing constraints. They never had to report to as 
many donors, each one with his own reporting requirements, and they would never have 
tolerated the project management mechanisms now imposed by donors as a way to ensure 
proper management of their projects. 
20. If the policy environment is to blame, surely donors must be considered part of the 
policy environment in which NARS had to function, and many of the problems they faced 
were indeed created not only by their governments but by well intentioned donors. The 
failure to take into consideration essential management dimensions in project design, and 
the disregard for institutional development, can explain many of the failures of NARS. It 
would be convenient to lay the blame on policy but it would not be accurate. Institutional 
development may be as important, if not more, to the development of performing NARS. 
21. The current indifference or hostility to non-public institutions involved in 
technology generation and transfer can be explained in a historical perspective. Most 
countries with a thriving agriculture relied on public institutions to develop technologies 
and promote their diffusion in the farming community. Developing countries are simply 
trying to copy models of development that have proved highly successful: as in USA, the 
European Union, etc. Can we blame them for following such models rather than 
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adopting the untested measures recommended by policy analysts who have little stake in 
the country’s development. Often, such policy prescriptions recommend the adoption of 
measures that are in vogue in developed countries, but which have little relevance in the 
present environment of NARS. 
22. Managing research through competitive research contracts is a case in point. It 
makes a great deal of sense in countries where the labour market is fully developed, and 
where individuals are supported by competitive institutions. The current shift towards 
natural resource management research following the Earth Summit of Rio illustrates the 
case. Developed countries can rely on the extent of their resource markets to hire new 
skills and shift promptly to the new agenda. Most West African countries, with the 
possible exception of Nigeria, will probably have to recruit young scientists, send them 
abroad for training, wait a few years while they are in training, count on losing a few (to 
non-public institutions operating in the region), and then operate the change. At best, 
only a few will be available at any one time in a given subject matter area. Competitive 
grants to researchers is an interesting institutional innovation, based on experience in 
developed countries, which does not take into consideration the challenge of managing 
research organizations in developing countries. 
23. Early interventions of the private sector in the USA and Europe were obviously 
tied to areas where the private sector could reap the benefits of its efforts, such as in farm 
machinery development in the USA, or in crop improvement. They did not invest in 
areas where the technology was more of a ‘public good’ character. If we consider the 
recommendation of the report to devolve much of the work in ‘production systems and 
management’ to NARS, it would seem that that will increase reliance on public 
institutions, as a non-public institution will not have much gain from developing 
technologies it will not be able to sell. 
24. In the overview of private sector research, the unwillingness of some West African 
countries to liberalize intellectual property restrictions is mentioned. However, the basis 
for this concern is not elaborated; as such it may be interpreted as an unjustified CGIAR 
interference in national policy matters. 
25. The Panel’s observations on impact are tenuous. The Panel’s comments rely upon 
Jahnke et al., (1985), which was not based on primary data from research sites or 
beneficiaries. The Panel has not added any significant evidence on which to base its 
assessment of impact. The Panel’s conclusions seem to be needlessly provocative, but the 
Panel should be aware of the reports on scientific and production impact that have 
appeared over the years since 1985. 
26. The suggestion that IFPRI be named as a strong convening centre for 
socioeconomics research in the region is too sweeping. We agree that economics 
research in the centres could be better linked, and that IFPRI could play an effective 
coordinating role for policy research. But the orientation and focus of IFPRI research, as 
set out in their MTP, differ significantly from the objectives of most economics research 
now conducted in commodity oriented Centres, which aim at micro-level technology 
development and evaluation. 
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27. While the original version of this report was a ‘draft’, it certainly has achieved 
wide availability within the System, and perhaps beyond it, since it was made available to 
donors attending the TAC meeting at ICW’94. This is most unfortunate, particularly in 
view of the concerns expressed regarding its content. The interests of the Centres and the 
sensitivity and needs of the donors would surely demand that draft reports of this kind are 
managed carefully before release. 
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Technical Advisory Committee 
Mr Chairman, 
Attached is the final report of the Panel on CGIAR Commitments in West Africa. I 
again thank you and your predecessor for this interesting task. 
The Panel benefitted initially from a Desk Study of Center commitments, done by 
the TAC Secretaria@. We visited West Africa in the last week of June 1994 and met 
TAC members and national program representatives during TAC 64 at Bouake, Cote 
d’Ivoire. The Panel traveled to Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Nigeria, Ghana, Benin, 
Cameroon, and the Gambia in August of 1994. It presented its draft report to TAC at the 
Committee’s 65th meeting. The Panel met at the TAC Secretariat from February 7, 1994 
through February 9, 1994 to consider the various comments on the draft report made 
during TAC 65 and afterwards. 
The report now incorporates the Panel’s reponses to comments made by the Centers, 
the Center Directors’ Committee, TAC itself, the NARS and others at TAC 65. I have 
replied in detail to the comments sent by the TAC, the CDC, ICRISAT, IITA, ILRI, 
ISNAR, and WARDA and discussed Dr Pin&up-Anderson’s remarks with him by phone; 
I have copied the replies to you and to the TAC Secretariat. 
Let me reiterate some of our main points and highlight the changes we have made 
since the draft report, both in response to comments and upon further reflection about 
some of the issues. 
Comments by the TAC 
The final report responds fully to TAC comments on the draft. Here we highlight a 
few of the main points made by TAC. One of TAC’s principal observations concerned 
issues in the report that went beyond the sub-region. TAC noted that it might be helpful if 
a section of the final report covered general systemic issues; this has been done in Annex 
3 of the final report, which also discusses how this study might be done in other regions 
where the Centers are active. 
The Desk Study (June 1994) is not attached to the Panel’s final report, but is available 
from the TAC Secretariat. 
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Genetic exports. TAC noted that the draft report’s comments on ‘genetic exports’ 
required further clarification because it considered that some of the Panel’s suggestions 
exceeded the brief of the CGIAR. The Panel agrees with this view; the final report states 
that actions in the area of genetic exports might be taken jointly by the Special Project for 
African Agricultural Research (SPAAR) and regional institutions in West Africa, not by 
CGIAR institutions. 
Nigeria. TAC commented that the draft report appeared to recommend an excessive 
concentration of Center efforts in Nigeria. We believe that the Center’s overall allocation 
to Nigeria is reasonable, in view of that country’s importance and the diverse 
opportunities it offers for research with implications outside its borders. We have 
recommended that a few additional staff of IFPRI and ICRISAT work on Nigeria, but this 
does not affect the aggregate very much. 
Comments by the CDC 
Several comments in the CDC summary are copied from the remarks sent by 
particular Centers. I have answered them in the individual replies and in the final report 
as appropriate. Reference to some of the CDC’s observations follows. 
The small NARS. These NARS basic problem is that they are too small to justify 
major investments by individual Centers in view of other demands on Center resources. 
Their basic need is more trained people; to fill that need, they must have academic 
training. Those are the reasons why a stable, long-term arrangement with academic 
institutions is both essential and preferable to a like arrangement with a Center. This does 
not exclude Center contribution to these countries through the usual mechanisms, nor 
need it interfere with the development of a pluralistic research system. 
Administration costs. The draft report did not endorse the opinion that IARC 
administrative costs were higher in West Africa than in industrial countries; it only 
referred to such an assertion having been made in a TAC paper and then proceded to say 
why the Panel lacked the information to evaluate the assertion and to speculate about why 
such an assertion would be groundless anyway. 
Water and irrigation issues. The final report argues that many of what appear to be 
researchable problems in West Africa on water and irrigation have solutions that are 
already well known and can be easily transferred from other regions where irrigation is 
much more important than West Africa. Examples are marginal cost water pricing, strong 
property rights, efficient water markets, and the transfer of public irrigation schemes to 
private farmers. 
We assumed that most issues about IIMI, including its regional allocation to West 
Africa, were covered by its recent external reviewi’. On one particular point, the 
CDUIIMI noted that “the report also appears to discount the strong interest shown by 
We further recognize our failure to say nothing about ICLARM or about fisheries in 
general, but this error can perhaps be rectified by the current ICLARM external review. 
. . . 
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governments in exploring fully the possibility of applying irrigation to their food security 
needs ” . Naturally we do see the importance of developing irrigation in the region where it 
is economically efficient. But some of the “possibilities of applying irrigation” in the 
region are good illustrations of the failure to develop a long-term perspective, as 
discussed in Annex 2 of the Report. The Centers should not provide research to support 
inefficient policies which lead to unsustainable production systems just because 
governments. are interested; research on managing irrigation for wheat production in 
Nigeria comes to mind. 
Organization and Process 
We saw no reason to change our view that the current organization of the CGIAR 
commitments in the region is reasonably efficient and cost-effective. (You will not be 
surprised to learn that the Centers had no disagreement with this conclusion). While 
administration costs need to be investigated in individual Center reviews, we doubt that 
savings from various reforms are very consequential. 
A key process issue is how to incorporate NARS opinions into the formulation of 
IARC programs. Though we have received comments on the draft report only from Togo, 
the Gambia, and GIMM (from Professor Haizel, who is a regional representative to the 
CGIAR) on the draft report, the report is based partly on discussions with national 
programs in seven countries (Mali, Burkina, Ghana, Niger, Nigeria, Benin, and the 
Cameroon) and Dr Ouayogode is himself a NARS representative. Annex 1 of the report 
reviews WARDA’s experience with this question. We adhere to our conclusion that 
current mechanisms of collaboration between the IARCs and the NARS are efficient and 
do not require systemic changes. 
The Panel found four other structural or process reforms that would, in its view, 
significantly improve the impact of the IARCs in West Africa. The first is to lessen the 
concentration of ICRISAT research at Sadore. Given that ICRISAT has already moved to 
diversify its work away from Niger, one may consider this a moot point, but it is one that 
requires continuing re-evaluation in light of ICRISAT’s overall resource allocation in the 
region and in light of the universal difficulties in raising agricultural productivity in the 
semiarid tropics. A second concerns the ILRI programs in Nigeria, where we have 
recommended a consolidation of two small programs and a firmer commitment to a stable 
ILRI presence in the humid and subhumid zones. The third is to make IFPRI the strong 
convener of social science research across the Centers in West Africa. The fourth is to 
deemphasize and reorient production systems and management research in the IARCs. We 
return to these points below. 
Production Systems and Management Research (Category 3) 
This issue provoked voluminous comments from individual centers and from the 
CDC. There was, I think, some misunderstanding. We did not say that the Centers should 
“forego research” on Category 3; we did say that they should concentrate on basic 
process problems, as ICRAF is doing, and develop explicit partnerships with the national 
programs to devolve the leading role in applied production systems research to the 
NARS. Nor did we say that no one should do this work; the NARS should do most of it 
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The growth of national research capacity in the region, and the many failures in this 
category worldwide, impose a smaller role for the IARCs. 
We therefore maintain our recommendation that the Centers should devolve that part 
of their work in Category 3 that is not consistent with their main responsibility for 
strategic research to the national programs. Resulting savings should be invested in 
Category 2 (Germplasm Enhancement and Breeding) because most productivity gains have 
come from that category. I expect that implementing this recommendation will require 
some attention from the external reviews of each Center. 
The ‘Role of IFPRI 
The draft report of the Panel recommended that IFPRI be designated as the convener 
of all Center social science research in the region, including that of ISNAR, to provide 
stronger leadership in that field. Despite the general unpopularity of this recommendation, 
we have retained it. We believe that social scientists based in West Africa and those 
working on it from IARCs outside the region, are too isolated, lack a coherent strategy 
and unified approach to common problems, and have failed to exploit important 
opportunities in this field. The recommendation is definitely not that IFPRI should do all 
this research, but that it should lead it. 
Dr Ryan and Dr Pinstrup-Andersen have alike objected that such an arrangement 
will weaken microeconomic research now done in the commodity Centers in close contact 
with natural scientists. While we take this objection seriously, it is not an insurmountable 
problem. The point of the arrangement would be to ensure that such work fits into the 
policy analysis, much of which is impossible without a good knowledge of the technical 
relations. 
Institution Building, Training and Information 
We have kept the draft’s recommendation that the Centers, with the exception of 
ISNAR, should limit their activities in Category 5 (institution building) to training and 
information and should abandon organization and management counseling because it is not 
in their comparative advantage. The overall size of training and information activities 
should also be reduced and the savings transferred to Category 2 in view of the many 
sources of training and information services outside the Centers. We maintain the opinion 
that ISNAR’s future in the region is not well-defined and believe that designating IFPRI 
as the regional convener of IARC social science research would define that role more 
clearly. 
The Impact of ICXISAT and ILCA 
In a letter to Dr McCalla, I said that ICRISAT and ILCA, in contrast to IITA, have 
“really had no impact in West Africa and it is very hard to see what the impact of some 
of their current work will be. ” It might have been better initially to put that conclusion in 
a broader context; it has been difficult to achieve research impact in dry areas 
everywhere--in the United States, Latin America, Australia, the Middle East, as well as 
Africa--and this is the challenge for everyone, not only for the Centers. 
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My earlier conclusion provoked a long reply from ICRISAT and a briefer one from 
ILRI. With those replies, and with other additional information, we have again looked 
carefully at impact. 
In light of ICRISAT’s comments about the scientific impact of research, including 
publications, apart from their eventual production impact, we have modified the report in 
one place to give due credit to scientific impact. We note here that ICRISAT has 
produced more than twice as many advanced lines and varieties of millet, sorghum, and 
groundnut in West Africa in 1993-94 as it did in 198592; this is not production impact, 
but it is a hopeful sign, 
ICRISAT commented extensively about the reasons for its lack of production impact 
in West Africa, most notably for the failure to have measured adoption of its varieties at 
even the local level. In making the criticism, we recognized fully the environmental 
difficulties involved, as well as the debility of the national systems of technology 
generation and transfer. While it is clear that ICRISAT is doing the right thing in moving 
resources away from Sadore to other sites in the region and in changing its aggregate 
structure to achieve better synergies between African and non-African research, we have 
not changed two major recommendations about ICRISAT. The first is to devolve much of 
Category 3 research to the national programs and to concentrate more on basic process 
questions. 
The second is to commission a fundamental scientific review of ICRISAT’s crop 
improvement work in West Africa, including that of CIRAD for sorghum. The Panel did 
not have the competence to do this, but my strong belief is that such a review is needed 
because the plausible solutions have been tried for a long time--introducing exotic 
materials, exploiting the characteristics of local materials, intensive screening for sources 
of biotic stress resistance, and increasing the harvest indices--with little noticeable field 
impact. Furthermore, the contrast between ICRISAT Asian successes with crop 
improvement and its failures with resource management suggests that we will observe a 
similar contrast in West Africa--as clearly seen in ICRISAT’s section of “Current CGIAR 
Research Efforts and Their Expected Impact on Food, Agriculture, and National 
Development” (CGIAR Secretariat, March 1994)--this expectation logically shifts more 
emphasis to crop improvement. The failure to find durable solutions is not exclusive to 
ICRISAT, but has occurred with colonial research, the independent NARS, bilateral 
programs, and regional programs like SAFGRAD. 
ICRISAT has replied to this second recommendation to suggest in its place a study 
of the constraints to adoption of improved materials of millet and sorghum. The Panel 
could not accept this suggestion. The basic constraint to adoption has long been evident: 
the introduced materials are not better than the locals under field conditions, even in 
farmer-managed trials when there are no problems with extension, input supply, risk, or 
marketing. We need to know why the “improved” materials are not really improved. 
There is one other question about ICRISAT. The draft report recommended that the 
question of separating ICRISAT’s African activities from its non-African work be 
considered again in the near future. The final report omits this recommendation to avoid 
giving the false impression that the Panel has endorsed the notion. 
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ILRI contended that the Panel “has not added any significant evidence on which to 
base its of assessment” beyond what was in the Impact Study of Africa. I assure you that 
we have. I have again reviewed ILCA’s own submissions about its impact in West Africa, 
including Dr Fitzhugh’s presentation at the World Bank last fall (which summarized 20 
years of ILCA research), the ILCA material in a CGIAR paper (“Current CGIAR 
Research Efforts and Their Expected Impact on Food, Agriculture, and National 
Development”, March 1994)) and an ILCA study (“Potential for Impact: ILCA Looks to 
the Future”, April 1992) published soon after ILCA’s past external review. I have also 
interviewed Dr Boubacar Hassane, the president of the national livestock owners’ 
association of Niger and who wrote his PhD on fodder production in northern Nigeria, to 
discuss the impact of ILCA’s work. I see no convincing reason to change the Panel’s 
report on ILCA’s current impact. While, as ILRI’s reply to the draft report says, it may 
be true that “the jury is still out” on the future impact of both fodder banks and alley 
farming for livestock production, the benefits of research to the present have been less 
than the costs. Given the paucity of ILRI’s expected allocation to West African research, 
I remain very doubtful about the future impact. 
A Common IITA and WARDA Board 
The draft report erroneously justified its proposal for a common IITA and WARDA 
Board in terms of an insignificant benefit, i.e., cost savings. The real benefit of a 
common Board is to harmonize research. We have, therefore, retained the 
recommendation and have further incorporated Dr Lampe’s suggestion that IRRI be 
represented on the proposed common Board. 
Let me say that the Panel strongly supports the Centers’ efforts in West Africa, 
admires the significant successes that have been achieved and expects those successes to 
multiply in the future. We hope that nothing in this report will be used to diminish the 
overall level of resources available for Center activities in the region. While our report 
perhaps emphasizes criticisms of the Centers by the national programs, we found that the 
NARS are generally very appreciative of the Centers’ research; the best proof of this is 
their growing interest in closer scientific collaboration. 
I would like to close by thanking you and Dr McCalla again for this assignment, and 
by expressing my appreciation to Dr Bakary Ouayogode, the other Panel member, as well 
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1. WHAT SHOULD BE THE ROLE OF THE IARCS IN WEST 
AFRICA? 
The rapid growth of the national agricultural research systems (NARS), the 
heavier presence of the IARCs since about 1980, lagging agricultural growth, and 
concerns about the efficiency of the CG system have prompted a review of the IARCs’ 
role in West Africa’. This report provides a reconsideration by asking: What is the 
appropriate role of the IARCs in West Africa, given (i) the changes in the national 
programs, including possible contributions from the private sector; (ii) the novel 
ecoregional perspective; (iii) the likely evolution of farming systems in the region; and 
(iv) lessons of IARC experience in the region and outside, including the recommendations 
of the Impact Study, external reviews of individual centers, the Priorities Study and the 
various Stripe Reviews? 
Specifically: 
b What does the evolution of the national programs mean for IARC activities? 
b What changes should be made in IARC relations with partners? 
b What can the Centers most efficiently contribute to the institutional 
development of the national programs? 
b Are there any IARC responsibilities that should be devolved to the NARS, including 
commodities, themes, or ecoregions? 
b What are the views of the NARS on these questions and on the 
activities of the IARCs in general? 
b How do the activities of the Centers conform to the ecoregional 
approach? 
b Should there be major changes in the regional organization of the 
IARCs, to accommodate the ecoregional approach or other proposed institutional 
alternatives? What are the alternative roles (eg, those proposed by the vision paper)? 
b Is there costly duplication across IARCs in activities? 
w Are there costly gaps in the Centers portfolio? 
1 West Africa means Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Cote d’Ivoire, the 
Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, 
Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo. Bamako usually refers also to 
Samanko, Niamey to Sadore, and Kano to Bagauda. 
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l Are there other measures that the IARCs can take to make their 
commitments more efficient? 
b Do the Centers use adequate methods to measure all their impacts? 
Materials 
The report relies on a Desk Study done by the TAC Secretariat of Center 
spending, staffmg, and programs in 1992, supplemented by information from ISNAR 
about Center activities in 1986. The Desk Study is the database of this report. The first 
draft of the Desk Study was distributed for comment to the Centers in March, 1994; the 
second draft of June, 1994 reflects those comments. The Panel visited Cote d’Ivoire in 
June 1994 and Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Nigeria, Benin, Ghana, the Cameroon and the 
Gambia in August 1994 to gather other information and to interview staff in the IARCs 
and in the NARS. It presented a draft report to TAC 65. It then received comments from 
TAC, the Centers, the national programs of Togo, Ghana, and the Gambia, and other 
participants at TAC 65, which it incorporated into this final report. 
Outline 
The report first sketches the main agricultural characteristics in the region 
(Section 2). It continues with a summary of the principal types of research institutions 
(Section 3) before discussing the major issues of the report (Section 4) and summarizing 
the recommendations (Section 5). 
2. THE ECONOMIES OF WEST AFRICA 
Table 1 outlines the region’s economies. Roughly 215 million- people live 
there, of whom some 70 % are employed in agriculture. Agriculture--crops, livestock, 
forestry, and fisheries--provides about 40% of the regional product, varying from 23% 
(Senegal) to 55 % (Mali). Average regional GDP is low, less than US$400 per caput, and 
declined in many countries from 1980 to 1992. 
The main field crops are maize, sorghum, millet, rice, cassava, yam, cowpea, 
and groundnut. The chief tree crops are banana, plantain, coffee, cocoa, oilpalm, rubber 
and coconut. Cereals dominate the semiarid countries (Mauritania, Senegal, Mali, 
Burkina, Niger, Chad, northern Nigeria and Cameroon) while roots, tubers, and tree 
crops dominate the subhumid and humid (Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, 
Togo, Benin, and the central and southern parts of Nigeria and Cameroon). Rice and 
maize are grown throughout the region. 
The chief problems relevant to the mandate of the IARCs in West Africa are 
agricultural growth with an employment content adequate to relieve poverty and 
alleviating the environmental degradation associated with agricultural intensification. Are 
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the problems facing West African agriculture so different that they impose a different 
mandate on the CGIAR Centers from other regions? 
The basic arguments for concentrating on food production as a growth strategy 
are three. First, food is always a high share of the consumption of the poor, so that gains 
in food productivity translate into welfare gains for the poorest. Second, many poor 
consumers of the basic foods also produce those crops and have few alternatives for 
raising their incomes. Third, food output is a high share of farm output, so the latter 
cannot develop without improvements in the former. These arguments are quite strong in 
West Africa. In addition, there are economic limits to complementary strategies based on 
expansion of cash crops. Perennial crops in the humid zones face both rising economic 
and environmental costs. Cash crops except cotton and groundnut have low additional 
potential in the semiarid climate without irrigation, and groundnut faces competition from 
oil crops produced outside Africa. 
The growth path of West Africa agriculture has shifted, and will do so more 
and more, toward intensification--that is, to higher output per unit of land and to higher 
variable inputs per unit of output. Intensification is expected to induce higher costs of 
environmental degradation through: (i) greater soil erosion and weed infestation induced 
by shorter fallows; (ii) loss of organic matter from intensively cultivated soils; (iii) loss of 
vegetative cover from overgrazed areas; (iv) damage to water sources and wildlife from 
greater quantities of agrochemicals; and (v) deforestation. 
2.1. The Evolution of West African Farming Systems 
We refer to three climates: the semiarid tropics, the subhumid tropics, and the 
humid. Ruthenberg refers to humid climates, semi-humid climates, semi-arid climates, 
and the tropical highlands (1980, p. xi). TAC refers to warm arid and semiarid, within 
which IITA distinguishes the northern Guinea Savanna or moist savanna and mid-altitude 
semiarid; the term semiarid tropics is used here. TAC refers to warm subhumid climates 
and IITA to southern Guinea Savanna, derived savanna, coastal savanna, acid woodlands, 
mid-altitude savanna, and volcanic areas; TAC further refers to warm humid and IITA to 
humid forest and mid-altitude and highland savanna and woodlands; the term subhumid 
tropics is used here. TAC also refers to cool climates, which do not occur in West Africa 
(YIITA, 1992, p. 7). While the problems of these climates occur throughout tropical 
agriculture, they are unusually severe and widespread in West Africa. 
Unproductive environment. Soils are poor, attacks of pests, diseases and 
parasitic weeds are aggressive and rainfall is irregular and often deficient. A long dry 
season reduces vegetative production. Cloud cover slows photosynthesis in wetter areas. 
Weeds become troublesome under continuous cultivation. Transport costs are high as a 
share of producer price and of variable cost, making it unprofitable to intensify with 
modem purchased inputs because output/input price ratios are too low. Irregular 
topography makes water control harder and more expensive. Heat and humidity reduce 
the time for work and cut the productivity of labor when it is employed. 
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Variable environment. Agriculture is highly variable even with so many 
common environmental features. IITA’s characterization of 14 countries of humid and 
subhumid West Africa described at least 13 farming systems, distinguished by their major 
crops (five cereals, cassava, yam, cotton, and four perennials) and six major contrasting 
conditions of population density and market access (Manyong et al, 1994). ICRISAT 
village studies in Burkina Faso, Niger, and Mali found many discrete systems with 
different farm sizes, cropping patterns, types and levels of mechanization, soil fertility 
and weed control practices, intercropping, and productivity. Variability makes the average 
fixed costs of research and extension greater per unit of land because there are so many 
discrete sub-systems among which the costs of identifying and transferring research 
results are high. 
Expensive irrigation. There are poor prospects for economical irrigation, 
though this may change somewhat in the CFA countries after the 1994 devaluation, 
because of physical constraints that cause irrigation investments to be expensive. 
Therefore, and unlike much of East Asia, India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh, irrigated 
farming in West Africa is likely to remain secondary because it is so costly. This implies: 
(i) slower adoption of modem inputs in aggregate; (ii) smaller spillovers from irrigated 
into rainfed areas through factor, input and product markets; (iii) isolated genesis of 
highly productive and homogeneous farming systems by intensification of a few crops, 
such as the rice-wheat systems of Asia; (iv) lesser chance of diversifying into 
higher-value crops; (v) remoter prospect of multiple cropping to boost total land 
productivity; and (vi) inability to use silt deposition from flood and irrigation waters to 
restore soil fertility. 
Small farms. The principal farm type, a small holding of 2-3 hectares, blocks 
some innovations that are profitable on larger operations. Examples of such innovations 
include motorized arable cropping, ranching, and estate agriculture with permanent crops 
under intensive management. Small farms raise the cost per farmer of management, 
research, extension, processing and transport. 
Effect of climate on livestock adaptation. Trypanosomiasis, other diseases, 
and the continuous heat and humidity devalue indigenous stock productivity in the wetter 
climates. The hot and humid climate stops the introduction of European dairy breeds. 
Innovations depending on those breeds, such as intensive smallholder dairying or ley 
farming with grasses or legumes as found in highland East Africa, are usually impossible 
in West Africa, thus closing one path of agricultural development. 
Institutions. Public and private institutions alike are often unable to stimulate 
agriculture. Public extension services are poor. Some technologies that might have been 
more widely adopted, such as hybrid maize, lag behind their potential because of the 
weakness of the public extension service. Private research, extension and input supply are 
weak and sometimes totally absent. Attempts by comparatively powerful international 
seed companies to establish stable and profitable businesses have generally failed. 
Given these basic features, what are the most probable expansion paths in the 
three climates? What should be the emphasis of the various centers with respect to 
profitable research directions? The most likely avenues of growth are outlined in Dumont 
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(1957), Boserup (1965), Ruthenberg (1980), and Pingali et al (1987), among others. If 
IARC programs radically diverge from those paths, then either the basic theory is 
fundamentally wrong, circumstances have changed to render it obsolete, or the approach 
of the Centers is misguided. 
2.2. The Humid and Subhumid Tropics 
Ruthenberg observed that “The permanent cultivation of upland in a hot, 
humid climate presents some of the most troublesome problems of tropical agriculture” 
(p. 127). The toughest problems are soil erosion and weed invasions, which occur rapidly 
when land clearing for farming removes the natural vegetation, and pest and disease 
attacks, which devastate introduced cultivars. Ruthenberg concluded that the efficient 
solutions to those problems are irrigated rice, intensive root crop cultivation, or 
permanent crop cultivation. Other alternatives, initially proposed by analogy with 
European farming, such as forest clearing for annual crop cultivation with heavy 
applications of chemical inputs, induce such soil erosion, nutrient leaching and pest or 
weed infestation that they quickly become unsustainable2. An additional problem in West 
and Central Africa is animal trypanosomiasis which lowers the return to ruminant 
livestock production and prevents farmers from using mixed farming to maintain soil 
fertility. 
Any innovative farming system that seeks to provide higher incomes than the 
traditional alternatives must also protect against erosion, weeds and pests. Irrigated rice is 
the common solution throughout Asia, but covers only small areas of hum@ and 
subhumid West Africa because of the costs of water control and soil problems. In theory, 
intensive root crop cultivation both covers the soil and provides a marketable surplus of 
the subsistence crop, while permanent crop cultivation also protects the soil and provides 
enough cash income to purchase subsistence. In practice, Ruthenberg concluded that 
irrigated rice is often uneconomic and argued that “there may be technically feasible 
solutions to the problems of permanent cultivation, but their economic returns are as yet 
still marginal” (p. 128). There is now more awareness of environment problems caused 
by agrochemicals, including pest resistance, thus adding additional costs. 
Research in the Centers is broadly consistent with the lessons of experience 
with the humid zones of West Africa. Work at IITA on alley farming, improved fallows, 
and live mulches recognizes the necessity to maintain the vegetative cover and control 
weeds in a permanent cropping system. The Slash and Bum Program explicitly recognizes 
the linked problems of maintaining vegetative cover to protect the soil, while providing 
higher incomes to producers in a permanent cropping system. WARDA’s program takes a 
careful approach to the problems of vegetative cover, weed management, and the fate of 
agrochemicals in this environment. 
2 Dumont (1957) gives a lucid and prescient account of the unhappy fate of such 
alternatives in the Congo soon after World War II. 
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2.3. Semiarid Tropics 
Ruthenberg was more optimistic about the semiarid tropics, because the costs 
of land clearing for stable field systems are lower than in the humid zones. More 
complete land clearing allows field cropping and pasture systems to replace shifting 
fallows, thereby permitting some farming practices--field mechanization, plowing, 
planting and. cultivating in rows, mixed farming with stable animal production--that are 
impossible where it is wetter. He argued that the growth paths for the semiarid tropics are 
irrigated agriculture, ley farming, large-scale ranching, or more intensive upland cropping 
with shorter fallows. Irrigated agriculture and ley farming are usually not economic. 
Large-scale ranching is both uneconomic and technically infeasible while being socially 
impossible because it would deprive small farmers and ranchers of their land rights. 
Hence, more intensive upland farming and livestock production are the feasible expansion 
paths, necessarily accompanied by shorter fallows associated with rising population 
pressure. 
Research in the Centers is consistent with this concept. ICRISAT seeks to 
develop stable cereal-legume production systems with higher yields. Work at IITA, 
ICRISAT and ICRAF on agroforestry supports both more intensive cereal and legume 
cultivation with trees. WARDA assists irrigated rice research in the Sahel. Inconsistent 
initiatives--mainly large-scale ranching--have not been supported by the IARCs. Other 
inappropriate work--strict monocropping, overreliance on chemical crop protection in lieu 
of biological control--has not been very consequential in the IARCs’ work. 
3. RESEARCH INSTITUTIONS 
3.1. National Agricultural Research Systems 
West African NARS have grown substantially since 1980 (Table 2). The 17 
countries now spend more of their agricultural GDP on research, have more PhDs and’ 
other graduate degree holders, and manage larger and better facilities (stations, labs, 
vehicles, information management and communications). In seven of the eight largest 
countries (no information is available on Cameroon) the number of scientists per farmer 
has grown at least 17 % with an average growth of 28 % . Some programs (eg, Mali, 
Senegal, Niger, Nigeria) have recently reorganized and decentralized in an effort to lower 
management costs. 
West African research investment is still unsatisfactory. Spending is less than 
that of competing countries in such key import substitutes as rice, maize, and sugarcane; 
livestock and perennial crop exports (coffee, cocoa, oil palm, rubber, pineapples, fruits), 
and annual crop exports (cotton, groundnut, vegetables). Funding depends excessively on 
foreign donors. One cost of expansion has been a decline in operational funding per 
scientist with detrimental effect on the rate of capacity utilization of trained personnel in 
research. 













National Agricultural Scientists Foreign Agricultural Scientists 
All Agronomists All Agronomists 
(1) 
73.0 15 18 1 
33.0 n.a. 26 n.a. 
246.8 n.a. 104 n.a. 
41.0 23 n.a. n.a. 
235.7 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
19.0 5 3 0 
198.0 55 39 9 
5.0 3 0 0 
37.0 11 21 1 
937.9 n.a. 18 n-a. 
104.0 16 35 5 








































Note: Information unavailable for Benin, Cameroon, Guinea, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Togo. 
Changes in numbers of scientists are (( 1986-90) - (1976-80))/( 1976 - 1980) 
Source: Data in columns,(l)-(4), (6), and (7) for Burkina Faso, Chad, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Mauritani, Niger, Senegal in 1990 
are from Weijenberg et al, 1993, pp. 71-88 
Data in column (5) for Mali from Mazzucato, 1994b, p. 9; for Senegal from Mazzucato and Ly, 1994, p.9; 
for Niger from Mazzucato and Ly, 1993, p.8; for Cote d’Ivoire from Roseboom and Pardey, 1994, p.10; 
for Nigeria from Roseboom et al, 1994, p.17; for Ghana from Roseboom and Pardey, 1994, p.10; for Burkina Faso from Mazzucato, 1994a, p.10. 
Data in columns (1) - (7) for Cote d’Ivoire in 1986-90 are from Roseboom and Pardey, 1994, p-10. 
Data in columns (1) - (7) for Nigeria in 1986-90 are from Roseboom, Beintema, Pardey and Oyedipe, 1994, pp.l’7-18. 
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ISNAR has provided more detail on Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, 
Mali, Niger, Nigeria, and Senegal which are the major programs in the region. The 
ISNAR data do not give the precise share of basic research in the major countries, but it 
is clear that it is very small. Panel interviews with NARS staff in eight countries also 
indicate that they do little, if any, basic and strategic research. The ISNAR statistical 
briefs report subsector shares of research as follows: crops, 44.2% ; livestock, 18.9% ; 
forestry, 6.9 % ; fisheries, 8.1% ; natural resources, 4.5 % ; other (including post-harvest 
and economics), 17.3 % . It is not possible to determine the commodity or ecoregional 
focus of the major NARS from available information. 
Problems with effective public research in the independent NAR!3. The 
return to additional investment on food crops has been poor since independence after 
1958. Technologies from national research--planting materials, crop and land management 
practices, fertilizer and pest control recommendations, forage crops, livestock breeds and 
animal management practices--are not widely used. Examples of research failures are 
noted in Matlon (1985) for millet and sorghum in the semiarid zone; McIntire, Bourzat, 
and Pingali (1992) for crop and livestock technology in Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, and 
Nigeria; IITA (1992) for sole crop cowpea and sorghum in northern Nigeria. Exceptions 
are modern varieties of mangrove rice in Sierra Leone and Guinea (Zinnah et al, 1993), 
the replacement of traditional floating rices in the Niger Delta of Mali by modem rice 
varieties (McIntire, 1980), the Florid0 yam cultivar in Cote d’Ivoire (personal 
communication of Dr Sekou Doumbia) maize cultivars in Mali, and cowpea in Senegal 
(Oehmke and Crawford, 1992). The basic explanation for low and inconsistent impact is 
historical underinvestment in staff and in the financial resources that would allow national 
staff to use their skills, compounded by the weaknesses of the national extension services. 
The national programs have often been poorly managed in addition to lacking 
qualified staff and operational funds. There is excessive bureaucracy, little scientific 
autonomy, weak accountability, and poor incentives for good science. The national 
programs concentrate on crops, not on livestock or forestry, and rarely consider the 
interactions among system components that are prominent features of regional farming 
systems. 
To summarize, the national programs have not produced widely applicable 
results. However, at least six (Cameroon, Cote d’Ivoire, Burkina, Niger, Mali, Senegal) 
have become much stronger in capacity since the late 1970s. While the research output in 
those countries is still behind their research capacity, they might soon produce useful 
results despite various growing pains. A group of small countries (Mauritania, the 
Gambia, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Togo, Benin, and Chad)--has 
little capacity to do independent work. Nigeria is unique. Both the small countries and 
Nigeria present special challenges to the IARCs and these are discussed immediately 
below. 
3.1.1. Small Countries 
West Africa is one of five regions in the world with many small national 
programs. Gilbert et al (1992) have discussed the problem of small NARS, including 
those of Mauritania, the Gambia, Guinea Bissau, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Togo, Benin, and 
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Chad. In addition to the defining criterion of size Gilbert identified lack of a core 
institution, vulnerability to external influence, instability, “narrow scientific base and 
isolation” as particular afflictions. Those programs illustrate the kinds of institutional 
problems that most IARCs, with the exception of ISNAR, cannot deal with efficiently. 
Benin is the only country in the group with a significant Center presence; the others have 
one or two IARC scientists and limited other collaboration. 
The IARCs alone obviously cannot provide a solution to the institutional and 
scientific problems of these countries. Where selected national capacities in large or small 
countries--e.g. in farming systems research--are not strong, the Centers can provide 
assistance. But where national institutions are so weak as to be almost completely 
ineffective--as is the case of practically all the countries in this group--then the basis of a 
sustainable solution is to have a focussed bilateral project, tied to a foreign university 
because of the importance of adequate academic training in developing national capacity, 
that seeks to create a core national institution. The reason that a Center should not be the 
lead institution is that the size of the required commitment is so great as to detract from 
Center efforts in other countries of the region. The IARCs would complement this effort 
where they have a comparative advantage in doing so, but would not be the leading 
institution because of the size and duration of the necessary commitments. It should be 
apparent that this recommendation does not exclude direct collaboration by many different 
means between IARC scientists and colleagues in small national programs and that it sees 
a strong role for non-CGIAR regional organizations in assisting the small countries. 
3.1.2. Nigeria 
In 1992, Nigeria absorbed 56 percent of IARC resources in West Africa, an 
increase from the 23 percent of 1986. This change reflects the closing of the IITA 
bilateral program in the Cameroon (16.5 % in 1986 and 2.4 % in 1992) and the Nigerian 
devaluations beginning in November, 1986. 
Nigeria has 54% of the region’s population, 46% of its cropped area, 
more-than three quarters of its irrigated cropland and uses 70% of the mineral fertilizer 
(Table 1). It is the region’s social and intellectual leader, the major market and will 
eventually be the pole of economic growth. Its research problems are of unique 
importance. Nigerian agriculture represents the main ecoregions, crops, and farming 
systems. It is the world’s leading producer of cowpea and yam. The variability in its 
farming systems--crop type, prevalence of irrigation, the variety of intercropping, disease 
and pest pressure, population density, mechanization, and fertility management--make the 
country an uncommonly rich site. Nigerian research has produced useful knowledge on 
many topics and the national program, despite its current dilapidation, is still a strong 
partner. 
The political and economic difficulties of Nigeria have retarded the evolution 
of research in West Africa. Had Nigeria grown more rapidly, it is likely that it would 
now produce world class research and be the regional pole on yam, cowpea, and 
production systems management, at the least. That it has not done so has swollen the 
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Center’s overall effort in the region and maintained it in areas that might otherwise have 
been devolved. 
Nigeria’s agricultural, economic, and political importance lead the Panel to 
conclude that the Centers’ focus on it is appropriate and has to continue. The short-term 
aspects of the work should be the subject of constant internal review in the major 
Centers, but the country’s long-term importance is undeniable. 
We note that the argument that Nigeria is too expensive is dated. Nigeria was 
much cheaper than the CFA countries before the devaluation of the CFA in January 1994. 
The IITA MTP (IITA 1992, p. 102) reported that costs per position at Mbalmayo were 
48% more expensive than those at Kano. The Panel’s estimate of the difference after the 
devaluation is 23% in view of the dollar and local currency fractions in costs and the 
local currency cost increases expected by the Centers. Nigerian costs are expected to be 
less than in non-African Centers; The CGIAR Secretariat informed the Panel that IITA’s 
unit dollar costs (consisting mainly of Nigeria) decreased 31 % from 1988 through 1992, 
compared to a decrease of 7.4 % for ICRISAT and to increases of 44.8 % , 29.4 % and 
11.6 % for CIMMYT, IRRI, and all Centers, respectively. 
The Panel perceives two chief weaknesses in the IARC effort in Nigeria. 
First, IFPRI has neglected Nigeria. There have been IFPRI farm or consumer surveys in 
Niger, the Gambia, Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, and Rwanda, but the only research on 
Nigeria has been aggregate analysis of trade and fertilizer policy, and a paper on growth 
linkages that is more than a decade old. The Panel recognizes the difficulties of working 
in Nigeria, but notes that IITA, ILCA, and ICRISAT have surmounted those difficulties. 
The Panel recommends that IFPRI develop a permanent presence of two staff in Nigeria, 
preferably at Kano or Ibadan, with the staff having suitable close links to the major 
Nigerian universities like the ones that IITA and ICRISAT have. One of those staff would 
be the regional director of a joint social sciences program across all Centers working in 
West Africa (section 4.6). 
Second, the ILCA presence in Nigeria has’recently weakened. Given the 
importance of ruminant livestock in most Nigerian farming systems, and the complex 
interactions among crops, animals, pastures, and trees, research on animal agriculture is 
necessary to raise productivity. Though Nigerian scientists should be able to supply much 
of this research there will be a significant international component. The ILCA program in 
Nigeria has been unable to provide it in the past because of the neglect of senior 
management and now because of the uncertainty concerning management, staff, and 
resources of ILRI. The Panel recommends that: (i) the ILCA Kaduna program be 
transferred to Ibadan in order to give adequate size and stability to international livestock 
research in Nigeria; and (ii) ILRI commit itself to a long-term, stable, substantial (at least 
5 principal staff) group working in close collaboration with IITA and ICRAF at Ibadan. 
3.2. Private Sector Research 
The Centers’ efforts in West Africa conform in principle to the traditional 
division of labor between the public and private sectors in agricultural research and 
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extension. The Centers recognize the primacy of the private sector in transferring 
profitable technologies where the value added of incremental research is low and in 
generating technologies where the value added of research is appropriable by private 
agents. Accordingly, they do little on patentable innovations, such as machines, tools, and 
specialized livestock. They do some work on hybrids (maize and sorghum), but little 
compared to varieties (millet, sorghum, maize, rice, cowpea, groundnut and others) or 
vegetatively propagated crops3. 
Do feasible private alternatives now exist to compensate for the lack of 
effective public agricultural research? Are these alternatives likely to assist growth much 
in the near term? Would these alternatives indicate any change in the role of the Centers? 
Natural intensification and farmer experimentation. An important 
alternative is the natural process of intensification and farmer experimentation with novel 
practices in adopting new crops, animals, and farming methods. In West Africa, this has 
been a major form of technology generation and transfer in perennial and semiperennial 
crops (coffee, cocoa, oilpalm, cassava), annual crops (maize, cotton and groundnut), 
trypanotolerant livestock (N’Dama and Baoule cattle), processed livestock feeds (oil cakes 
and molasses in many countries), and mechanization (hand tools, grain mills, oil presses, 
animal traction). While this experimentation is valuable, some of its stimulus to growth is 
already spent (e.g., the introduction of novel rainfed crops) or will simply stimulate 
extension of agriculture onto new land (e.g., mechanization and trypanotolerant livestock) 
without necessarily raising yields. Natural intensification is likely to continue, but as a 
complement for public research, not as a substitute. 
Organized Private Research. Panel observations and other evidence indicate 
that private research whether foreign or domestic, is now negligible. There is some 
research embodied in farm inputs, such as veterinary drugs. Other inputs with research 
content are fertilizer, pesticide, and machinery use (including tools drawn by animals) in 
which applicability, rates, timing, and other recommendations to farmers reflect 
information derived from public research done in national programs or in their colonial 
antecedents. Private research cannot dramatically assist agricultural growth in the near 
term without improbably large new investments. 
Barriers to International Trade in Agricultural Technology. The weakness 
of private sector research in West Africa is due in part to public policy. David 
Gisselquist’s research on policy barriers to international trade affecting private generation 
and transfer of agricultural technology has important implications for the IARCs because 
it dulls the traditional public/private division of labor (Gisselquist, 1992). 
Gisselquist observed that many countries interfere with the private generation 
and transfer of agricultural technology by excluding imported inputs, failing to defend 
3 Other hybridizable crops of importance in West Africa, such as oilpalm and 
vegetables, are outside the Centers’ mandates. 
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intellectual property, setting up nettlesome standardization requirements, and restricting 
domestic and foreign movement of even simple innovations. He argued that such barriers: 
b slow the transfer of finished technologies, such as seeds, machines, 
fertilizers and other chemicals, and irrigation equipment across farming situations; 
b hamper the flow of knowledge, including plant breeding materials, and slow 
the rate of agricultural growth; 
b implicitly inflate the return to low-input technologies by taxing inputs; and 
b implicitly inflate the return to public research and extension. 
His general conclusion is that elimination of those barriers would accelerate 
agricultural growth without additional research, public or private. These findings are 
highly relevant to West Africa. We make the following recommendations based on them. 
b The donors of the CGIAR, the international monetary agencies, and private 
companies should intensify pressure on West African countries to liberalize their markets 
for agricultural inputs and for intellectual property. Some of this pressure should include 
externally-assisted efforts to develop producers’ organizations that are truly independent 
of government interference. Liberalized markets necessarily include unfettered 
arrangements for distribution of Center materials to private companies and producers’ 
organizations. Centers should not be involved in this pressure because of possible 
conflicts of interest. 
F Here we rephrase a point made about long-term perspective (Annex 2). 
Ignoring the eventual role of the private sector illustrates the failure to distinguish 
between true natural science research problems and others that are caused by bad policies 
demanding little or no natural science research for a solution. Specifically, research 
planning in the Centers must have a long-term vision about input costs and supply. While 
the distorting effects of input subsidies (e.g. fertilizer in Nigeria, water and pesticides in 
several countries) are manifest, the effects of non-tariff technology trade barriers may be 
invisible because they prevent the emergence of technology markets. Ex-ante analysis 
must recognize that the apparent return to low input agriculture, especially in the drier 
areas, may be an artifact of input trade barriers. Valuable time can be lost in developing 
low input practices that are economically sustainable only when market inputs are 
physically unavailable or overpriced. 
b Some of the unwillingness of West African countries to liberalize 
intellectual property restrictions, and other conditions affecting private research and 
extension, is probably due to the fear of uncompensated exports of their genetic materials. 
If TAC perceives that the region is not adequately compensated for genetic exports, and 
that restrictions on genetic material flows retard development of improved cultivars, then 
the Panel recommends that it commission a review in collaboration with SPAAR and 
regional institutions to: (i) identify the materials concerned; (ii) review safeguards, 
including intellectual property laws, bilateral agreements with private firms, and biosafety 
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regulations that protect regional countries against such exports; and (iii) recommend 
safeguards to protect both national and scientific interests. 
3.3. The IARCs 
The IARCs spent in 1992 some US$55 million on about 2,157 senior-staff 
months (SSM) in West Africa. Of the total SSM, roughly half was at IITA, 14% at 
ICRISAT, and nearly 11% at WARDA. While practically all IARCs are active in West 
Africa, 80% of the spending (Table 3) was in only four Centers: IITA (40.9%), ICRISAT 
(17.0%), WARDA (13.0%), and ILCA (8.9%). 
The 1992 breakdown in SSM by CGIAR activity category (Table 4) is: 1) 
natural resources, 20.3 % ; 2) germplasm enhancement and breeding, 22.0 % ; 3) 
production systems and management, 35.1% ; 4) public policy and management, 3.6% ; 
and 5) institution building, 19.0% (Table 3). Those are substantial changes from 1986 
(Table 5) when the breakdown was: 1) 13.5%; 2) 19.8%; 3) 49.3%; 4) 7.7%; and 5) 
9.7%. The IARCs have also become more centralized since 1986, though this is perhaps 
transitory; we cannot necessarily infer that greater centralization means coverage of fewer 
ecoregions and fewer farming systems. 
3.3.1. The Impact Study 
What does the Impact Study (Jahnke et al, 1985, nine country studies and 
other relevant thematic chapters) teach us about feasible and efficient reforms in CGIAR 
commitments in Africa? 
The Impact Study found the production effect of agricultural research in 
Sub-Saharan Africa to have been weak. It concluded “that the discussion of center impacts 
on agricultural production in tropical Africa cannot focus on any obvious success stories 
(p. 118)“. It did observe that: (i) that many “varieties released . . . can be related to center 
material (cassava, cowpea, millet, pigeon pea, and potato)” (p. 118); (ii) benefits from 
IITA work in Nigeria on farming systems with intercropping and “the identification of 
herbicides, insecticides, and fungicides” for the farming systems (p. 119); (iii) animal 
production innovations such as artificial insemination, pasture species, and pasture 
seeding techniques; (iv) cassava varieties and the yam minisett technique; (v) hybrids and 
improved open-pollinated varieties of maize; and (vi) better rice and sorghum cultivars. 
Some impacts have not been confirmed subsequently, notably those of millet cultivars, 
intercropping research, animal production innovations, and sorghum cultivars. 
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27.1 5.7 21.0% 
28.4 5.1 18.0% 
16.1 3.1 19.3% 
4.2 0.4 9.5% 
11.8 11.6 98.3% 
27.3 12.2 44.7% 
9.6 3.9 40.6% 
6.7 0.7 10.4% 
22.7 22.7 100.0% 
19.0 14.3 75.3% 
13.7 7.3 53.3% 
2.5 0.9 36.0% 
8.2 2.2 26.8% 
28.8 1.2 4.2% 
7.1 2.8 39.4% 
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Source: Desk Study, p. 27. 
TABLE 4: Activities of Major CGIAR Centres in West Africa, 1992 (Senior Staff-Months) 
Country Conservation Germplasm Production Economics 
and management of enhancement systems and and public 
natural resources and breeding management policy 








% of HULWA 
% of West Africa total 







% of SALWA 





10.8 25.9 38.4 4.9 
107.9 192.7 244.0 13.5 
1.8 4.3 5.2 0.7 
174.5 222.9 347.6 19.1 
18.2% 23.3% 36.3% 2.0% 



































































































Source: Desk Study, Table 3a 
TABLE 5: Activities of Major CGIAR Centres in West Africa, 1986 (Senior Staff- Months) 
Country Conservation Germplasm Production Economics 
and management of enhancement sys terns and and public 
natural resources and breeding management policy 








% of HULWA 
% of West Africa total 







% of SALWA 
% of West Africa total 
TOTAL 
%ofWA 










39.7 33.8 36.6 2.6 10.8 123.5 
1.2 6.2 75.3 35.2 1.5 119.4 
14.9 11.7 99.0 0.9 7.7 134.2 
23.6 27.4 46.7 13.0 1.0 111.6 
34.8 14.0 86.5 21.6 7.3 164.2 
114.2 93.0 344.0 73.3 28.3 652.9 
17.5% 14.2% 52.7% 11.2% 4.3% 100.0% 
6.2% 5.0% 18.6% 4.0% 1.5% 35.3% 
249.3 365.1 912.1 141.9 180.2 1,848.j 













6.5 0.2 9.1 28.0 
140.8 12.9 29.1 304.4 
54.4 7.4 44.3 174.7 
82.9 18.3 6.2 154.7 
202.2 29.3 60.5 428.8 
81.1 0.5 2.7 105.0 
568.0 68.5 151.8 1,195.6 
47.5% 5.7% 12.7% 100.0% 3 
30.7% 3.7% 8.2% 64.7% 
Note: Data for Guinea, Liberia, Equatorial Guinea, Togo, Chad, Cape Verde and Mauritania have been excluded 
from the 1986 data because they were unavailable for 1992, reducing the 1986 total by about 8% 
TABLE 6: Activities of All CGIAR Centres in West Africa, 1992 (Senior Staff- Months) 
Country Conservation Germplasm Production Economics 
and management of enhancement systems and and public 
natural resources and breeding management policy 
Institution 
building 
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%ofWA 20.9% 22.6% 33.3% 3.7% 19.5% 100.0% na 
CGIAR ACTIVITY CATEGORY 
Source: Desk Study, Table 3C. 
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Potential impact in West Africa in 1985 
The Study described innovations that it believed to have the potential for 
impact!. These were: (i) IITA cowpea varieties; (ii) IITA zero tillage practices for the 
humid zone; (iii) IITA maize varieties resistant to maize streak virus and downy mildew; 
(iv) IITA cassava clones; (v) IITA biological control of cassava mealybug and green mite; 
(vi) ICRISAT, new sorghum and millet varieties; and (vii) ILCA, enhanced knowledge of 
African livestock production systems, addition of forage legumes to farming systems, and 
crossbred dairy cows. 
Biological control of cassava mealybug (CM) has been profitable and would 
carry the entire cost of IITA for many years under certain assumptions (Norgaard, 
1988)5. IITA varieties resistant to maize streak virus have had a strong economic impact, 
as have IITA cassava materials. 
A major impact not foreseen in Jahnke’s study was scientific impact through 
publications and training, in which IITA and ICRISAT have been very strong. A strong 
impact is now visible in ISNAR assistance to national programs, which has helped to 
improve the political commitment to, and the organization and efficiency of, national 
research6. 
Some projected impacts have not materialized. 
Crop improvement. IITA cowpea varieties, of interest in the early 198Os, 
have not been adopted by farmers and the IITA cowpea program has since been 
redesigned in consequence (IITA, 1993). ICFUSAT sorghum and millet varieties are used 
on a small area and have produced no major economic benefits in West Africa (ICRISAT, 
1992a). 
Mechanization and land management. The Impact Study mentioned only 
zero tillage, on which research has had no measurable effect. Other research initiatives--a 
sand fighting tool and a wheeled tool carrier in the semiarid tropics, watershed 
management, strip cropping with Andropogon in dry areas, alley farming, animal traction 
for valley bottoms--have produced no measured incremental benefits. 
4 We stress that we are reporting here what Jahnke’s study said about the 
potential for impact to give the accepted 1985 view on the subject. We are not 
here discussing what the Centers actual impact was in 1985 or. now. 
5 IITA has now derived better field estimates of the benefits of biological 
control, that confirm Norgaard’s results (Neuenschwander and Hammond, 
1989). 
6 A related benefit will eventually derive from ICRISAT and WARDA 
application of quantitative economic criteria in research priority setting. 
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Legumes in the farming system. Alley farming, an Asian innovation studied 
and promoted in Africa by IITA, has not been adopted by farmers (for mulch, fodder, 
weed control, or labor savings) despite promising experimental evidence and economic 
analysis indicating that it would be profitable. Fodder banks, which at one time were 
projected to have economic benefits sufficient to pay for the total cost of the ILCA 
subhumid zone program in Nigeria, have not been adopted widely in that country 
(Hassan, 1993). 
The Impact Study adduced three general lessons. 
w Exotic plant materials did not work for direct use by farmers or for crop 
improvement. This is well known in rice, millet, and sorghum, though it would have been 
a lesser consideration in cowpea and yam. 
b National authorities did not give enough importance to creating a positive 
policy environment for agricultural growth. 
b An integrated technology transfer system--involving research, extension, 
and the private sector--had not matured except for some industrial crops. 
The Study argued that several basic changes were needed to have more 
impact. 
b Scientists should use more local materials in breeding programs, thereby 
incorporating more of their characteristics (vigor, pest resistance, photosensitivity, 
consumer preferences)7. 
w Research should seek response to low input levels, apparently as a way of 
making higher output more independent of uncertain input markets. 
b More work should be done on biological nitrogen fixation, both to improve 
soil properties and to make higher output independent of input markets. 
w More should be done on simple mechanical innovations, to raise labor 
productivity, relieve drudgery, and to permit land management that would otherwise be 
impossible. 
Are these basic changes really novel and are they likely to have impact? 
b Local materials were in fact often used in earlier programs (eg, French 
millet work in Niger, sorghum in northern Nigeria) without leading to widespread genesis 
and adoption of improved cultivars. ICRISAT and IITA confirm that local materials are 
now widely used in crop improvement research as sources of, inter alia, disease resistance 
and as checks in studies of processing quality (eg, for cassava, Silla et al, 1993). 
7 NARS scientists met by the Panel made the same observation on several 
occasions. 
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However, local materials are often of limited potential for crop improvement. For 
example, the variability in millet cultivars native to western Niger is small. 
b Response to low inputs is an economic and extension issue. Available 
planting materials and livestock can respond profitably to more purchased inputs (eg, 
fertilizers and concentrate feeds) than are now used by African farmers; the reason that 
they do not is that such inputs are often rationed or are not available at all. To take the 
most important input, mineral fertilizer, actual application levels are much lower than 
utility-maximizing levels. Second, there is a mountain of information on low input levels 
from experiments and demonstrations. The practical application of this information is not 
a research question, but an economic and extension one, and the payoff to further 
research will be negative unless planting materials change rapidly to allow higher 
output/input ratios (Crosson and Anderson, 1994). 
b Research on biological nitrogen fixation is not novel as much was done in 
the past on cropping systems with cowpea, groundnut and, to a lesser extent, Stylosanthes 
and Acacia. In some instances farmers use natural sources of nitrogen anyway (eg, acacia 
trees), in addition to nitrogen from leguminous field crops grown in mixes or rotations. 
b Simple and complex mechanical innovations alike have been proposed (eg, 
Dumont 1957, p. 59) studied and used throughout tropical Africa for years. They include 
plows, seeders, weeders; carts, hand tools, threshers, grinders, mills, presses, and other 
processing implements. While their benefits are evident, the hand of the IARCs in 
generating them has not been powerful as these machines result from private innovation 
and technology transfer. 
The Panel argues that the Centers, and other historic or current research, 
have long put these basic changes into practice or that they are not natural science 
research issues. This is not to denigrate those changes as sources of gain. It is to say that 
the gains would now be marginal, do not always require international research, and do 
not suggest any obvious reforms of the IARCs in West Africa. 
Effects of IARC spending on the national programs 
One Impact Study paper (Evenson, 1987) asked “whether the CGIAR Centers 
have influenced the size and character of the national research programs”; and whether 
CGIAR and national research have had any impact on crop productivity (p. v). He 
answered these questions with a 25 country sample, of which six are African and Ghana 
and Nigeria are West African. While his results are somewhat dated (1962-82) and were 
not derived from a wide sample of West African countries they are relevant because they: 
(i) include the biggest nation, Nigeria; and (ii) have predictive value about the evolution 
of NARS-IARCs relations in West Africa based on the experience of Asia and Latin 
America. 
His relevant findings about the first question were: (i) “IARC investment 
stimulated national research investment in most commodities” (p. 56); (ii) IARC 
investment stimulated African research on cereals in general and on maize, millets, and 
sorghum specifically, but reduced it on staples; (iii) some negative effects of IARC 
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investment on national research investment were observed and require further research; 
(iv) “investment in IARCs stimulates more national system investment than will a 
comparable amount of direct aid” (p. 57); (v) IARC impacts tended to lower the marginal 
effect of national research in the same climate, indicating some substitution between 
IARC and national research; and (vi) IARC results were both substitutes and complements 
for national research outside the climate of their central location. 
Estimated interactions (p. 53) between IARC research and national research 
were always negative for cereals in general and for maize, millets, and sorghum 
specifically in Asia and Latin America, while they were positive in both groups of 
commodities for Africa. This means that interactions between IARC and national research 
became negative in the more developed low-income countries. It bears the possible 
implication that the positive marginal effect of the IARCs on African national research in 
cereals, maize, millets, and sorghum may turn negative as African national programs 
become stronger*. 
His findings about the second question are: (i) IARC investments have been 
highly productive; (ii) those investments have been more productive than national 
research; (iii) IARC impacts are greater for countries in the same climate as the IARC 
central location (p. 55); (iv) IARC research was productive in Africa on maize, millets, 
and sorghum and on cereal crops in general, though not on staples in general; the latter 
result is apparently due to lack of impact on cassava and yam (p. 53). 
4. THE 1ssms 
4.1. Size of the CGIAR Commitments 
The IARCs 1992 commitments in West Africa were about US$55 million or 
some 25-30% of the total of NARS plus IARCs. This is perhaps the highest regional 
share in the world and is higher than can be justified on allocative efficiency grounds. 
Reasons for this overinvestment are: (i) weak national capacity; (ii) unusual importance of 
livestock; (iii) a complex set of technical problems (section 2.1); (iv) inability to transfer 
wheat, rice, and potato germplasm from abroad on the same wide scale that has been 
done elsewhere, making it imperative to concentrate on difficult crops like millet, 
sorghum, and rainfed maize; (v) rice is mainly rainfed, grown in disparate environments, 
and hence more costly to improve than irrigated rice in Asia; (vi) yam is rare elsewhere 
making West Africa necessarily the focus with attendant high fixed costs; (vii) almost 
complete dependence on a single food grain legume, cowpea, the others (beans, chickpea, 
8 Evenson’s analysis included none of the francophone countries of West 
Africa, so it cannot be used to speculate about the effects of CIRAD support 
to agricultural research there. 
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pigeon pea, lentil, faba bean, mung bean and the other grams) being of no importance in 
the region. Cowpea is a multipurpose crop--grain and leaf for food, leaf for fodder, a soil 
cover and a weed suppressor--that has been particularly difficult to improve; and (viii) 
political Balkanization, which raises costs of political and economic interaction. 
We expect these commitments to stay high. Reasons iii (unusually complex 
problems), iv (inability to transfer results), v (rainfed rice), and vii (cowpea) are unlikely 
to change much in the medium-term and will accordingly justify more agricultural 
research in West Africa than might be indicated by congruence analysis. 
p The failure of Nigeria’s national program to thrive prevents the IARCs 
from devolving yam and cowpea research fully (reasons (vi) and (vii)). This is also 
unlikely to change in the medium-term. 
F The recent reorganization of international livestock research is expected to 
reduce the resources allocated to West Africa for that sub-sector. The Panel makes 
specific recommendations about the allocation of the remaining livestock research 
resources (Section 5). 
b National capacities are growing in some of the larger countries. The Panel 
has specific recommendations about activity categories that would both reduce IARC 
commitments and shift resources among categories (Section 4.5). 
p The commitment figures do not generally include costs incurred elsewhere 
on behalf of West Africa such as those at ICRISAT Asia Center. Moreover, the 
commitment figures are costs and therefore do not reflect the additional (“spillover”) 
benefits West Africa receives from work done elsewhere by many Centers. 
4.2. Duplication and Gaps 
Duplication within and across Centers can occur among research on 
commodities, themes or climates at one time, among facilities at one time, and on 
commodities over time. Overlap with national programs is discussed in section 4.5 on 
devolution and in section 4.10.1 on NARS views on IARC interactions. 
Duplication on commodities. The Desk Study, the written responses of the 
Centers to the Desk Study, and the Panel’s visit to West Africa permit the conclusion that 
there is no significant duplication of research on commodities. Adequate collaborative 
agreements exist between CIMMYT and IITA on maize, between CIAT and IITA on 
cassava, and sweet potato was transferred from IITA to CIP some time ago. IITA has 
limited rice research to pre-breeding activities and a comprehensive agreement exists 
between WARDA and IRR19. ICRAP is the lead institution in a Sahel agroforestry 
network that includes ILCA and ICRISAT in addition to national and regional partners. 
9 We say nothing further about the WARDA/IRRI relation given that there has 
been an Inter-Center Rice Review. 
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The substance of the Centers’ responses to the Desk Study was that charges of duplication 
were exaggerated and we accept that. 
Duplication on themes and climates. Duplication occurs on striga, some 
plant diseases and insects, soils, agroforestry, and economics and public policy studies. 
This is inescapable from several perspectives. From a practical point of view, one 
example is that ICRISAT has agroforestry research at Niamey because trees are a 
necessary part of the ecoregional approach to the semiarid zone. It is unavoidable from a 
commodity and an ecoregional perspective because different themes manifest themselves 
diversely in different crops; eg, striga biology and control in sole crop millet in the 
Sahelian zone differ from striga biology and control in intercropped maize in the moist 
savanna. Serious and constructive mechanisms exist to reduce the costs of unnecessary 
duplication. In the natural sciences, Center staff are in close contact on common themes, 
through networks, joint experiments, scientific meetings, exchange of breeding materials, 
field visits, use of common methods, and sharing of laboratories, farms, and village 
research sites. The problem in the social sciences is not so much duplication on themes 
and climates as lack of leadership. The Panel has made a recommendation to develop this 
leadership (Section 5). 
Duplication of facilities. The Panel reviewed possible duplication at two sites: 
near Kano in northern Nigeria (ICRISAT, IITA, IIMI) and near Yaounde in the 
Cameroon (IITA and ICRAF). Near Kano, IITA and ICRISAT now have an effective 
working agreement to collaborate in administration and communications. ICRISAT has 
merged its Kano city office with that of IITA. The two work together at Bagauda. The 
Panel concluded that there was no duplication worthy of mention near Kano and that 
relations between IITA and ICRISAT staff there looked excellent. 
The Panel did not meet IIMI staff in northern Nigeria (there were none at post 
during the Panel’s visit after the departure of a principal staff member). From discussions 
with IITA, ICRISAT and IAR staff about IIMI’s role, the latter did not seem well 
integrated into the activities of IAR or into those of the other IARCs in northern Nigeria. 
We have no recommendation other than to endorse the IIMI External Review’s 
observation that “there is a need to rationalize and justify IIMI’s West African program 
so that more knowledge generation and institutional strengthening can be demonstrated.” 
(TAC Secretariat, 1994, p. 44). 
There is some duplication between IITA and ICRAF at Nkolbisson and 
Mbalmayo. This is explained by the history of IITA in Cameroon, where it had a large 
bilateral program that closed in 1992. The quick expansion of ICRAF within the national 
program (IRA) has caused some duplication. ICRAF has apparently decided that facilities 
within IRA at Nkolbisson, partially independent of those of IITA at Mbalmayo, are 
needed for the time being so as to be more closely integrated with IRA. Although it is 
obviously better that IITA and ICRAF work together in the Cameroon, it would be hard 
to argue that this duplication is a serious cost. The Panel estimates, based on information 
provided by IARC staff in Cameroon, that the cost of duplicate facilities (labs, offices, 
and fencing) is about US$500,000, or some US$12,500 in annual depreciation. This 
issue, including the eventual disposition of the physical facilities, should be taken up by 
the current IITA review. 
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Duplication over time. The Panel is concerned about duplication of research 
over time. IARCs sometimes repeat earlier studies; examples are intercropping agronomy 
in northern Nigeria, crop residue and rock phosphate management in Niger, Striga 
research, the proposed farming systems characterization in northern Nigeria, and the 
proposed IFPRUILRI research on livestock economics. We suspect, though we cannot 
prove it here, that there is duplication over time in crop improvement, notably in work on 
biotic stresses. 
The standard remedy for duplication is to recommend yet another coordinating 
mechanism. But those mechanisms--networks, scientific meetings, joint trials, field visits, 
literature reviews--exist and do not seem to have uprooted the problem of temporal 
duplication. The problem is one of management of scientists, not an institutional one. We 
consider it improbable that there are any broad recommendations that can solve this 
problem across Centers. It has to be solved within Centers through aggressive review of 
research proposals before they begin and of research results as they become available. 
Gaps. The list of gaps is surprisingly short. Our interviews with NABS 
scientists and managers suggested that the most serious gaps they perceived in the 
Centers’ portfolio were on cotton, tree crops (mainly coffee and cocoa), and research on 
irrigation wand water management. The question of work on cotton, coffee and cocoa has 
been raised often in the past and we have nothing to add; there appear to be good sources 
of research from national, bilateral, and commercial sources on these crops. 
F Irrigation and water management. NARS staff mentioned on occasion 
that more work on irrigation and water management is needed, an argument advanced by 
IIMI in its reply to the draft report. We do not believe that this is justified: Many of what 
seem to be technical or social research questions are in fact problems of public policy for 
irrigation and water management, for which solutions are available from areas of the 
world with longer and deeper irrigation experience. Examples are marginal cost water 
pricing, strong property rights, efficient water markets, and the transfer of public 
irrigation to private farmers. There are many ready sources of information on these issues 
that do not require local research beyond what the national programs can provide. 
4.3. Organization and Governance 
4.3.1. The Ecoregional Approach and the Commodity Focus 
The key innovation of ecoregional research has been said to be “linking the 
natural resources base to commodity production research”. In judging Center conformity 
with the approach, our operational definition was that it should: (i) focus on the 
possibilities of the whole environment (the system), not just on selected commodities; (ii) 
emphasize interactions among subsectors and resources, such as crops and livestock or 
trees and soil fertility; (iii) examine the growth of agricultural systems over time; and (iv) 
account systematically for natural resource and environmental costs. We cite only salient 
examples in what follows. 
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b Focus on possibilities of the whole environment. The MTPs of IITA and 
ICRAF are most clearly stated in the terms of the ecoregional approach, but the work of 
the other major Centers is quite consistent. WARDA has made the explicit choice of 
discrete farming systems for its work. The location of the ICRISAT Sahelian Center, and 
the evolution of work there among ICRISAT, ILCA, ICRAF and others also conforms to 
this part of the standard. 
b Focus on interactions among components. There are many instances of 
IARC research that effectively study interactions among components. Prominent ones 
include alley farming in IITA and ILCA (Nigeria), IITA’s Plant Health Management 
Division (Benin), ILCA and ICRISAT work on crop-livestock interactions (Niger and 
Nigeria), and studies of agroforestry at Ibadan, Niamey, and the Cameroon. 
w Resources and environmental costs. IITA has long studied soil erosion in 
the humid zone. ICRISAT has worked on management of crop residues with respect to 
maintenance of the soil resource at its station near Niamey and in adjacent villages. 
ICRISAT is now studying the relation between agricultural intensification and parasitic 
weed infestations in semiarid Mali. ICRAF’s West Africa program is well-conceived to 
look at these costs. There are many other examples. 
b Growth over time. Much of the interesting work in this area, notably in 
the environmental economics literature, is done outside the Centers and does not appear 
to be well reflected in their programs. With rare exceptions (e.g. Ehui and Spencer, 
1993, on sustainable agriculture in the humid zone) growth over time has not been a 
major concern in the West African Centers. 
Do crop specific mandates impede the ecoregional approach? A past answer 
may have been “yes” but it is now “no”. The best evidence is the programs of IITA and 
ICRAF. IITA’s cassava studies include biological pest control, a long-term collaborative 
effort on production systems, crop improvement and crop management. At Ibadan, IITA 
and ILCA study interactions among cattle grazing regime, maize cultivar, and crop 
management. ICRISAT works on agroforestry at Niamey and Bamako, as ILCA has for 
some time at Ibadan. The leading technology proposed by ILCA for central Nigeria, 
fodder banks, directly exploits links between crops and livestock in improving the land 
resource, while easing the transition to settled stock raising. 
Should the Centers move farther away from a commodity focus? 
There are unacceptable costs in moving farther away from a commodity focus. 
The basic incentive reason for a commodity focus is that farmers produce commodities 
after all, not environmental goods. A second reason is that commodity research has 
positive environmental effects by creating technical incentives to use high potential areas 
and not low potential ones. A good example is the selective intensification hypothesis--the 
idea, being tested by WARDA and CIAT, that intensification of the main technologies for 
the major crops (e.g. rice, pastures, vegetables) on high productivity areas will reduce 
population pressure on lower productivity, more environmentally fragile, areas. Another 
good example is ICRAF’s MTP for the humid lowland tropics and the semiarid lowlands 
of West Africa, which gives cogent reasons for its choice of commodity species and 
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shows how those species fit into the ecoregional model. Third, it is possible to achieve 
benefits of the ecoregional approach through commodity research. For example, there are 
environmental gains from the biomass effect of higher crop yields through: (i) longer soil 
cover into the hot, dry season, thereby reducing wind erosion; (ii) longer supply of crop 
residues into the dry season, thereby reducing grazing pressure on marginal pastures and 
browse; (iii) heavier soil cover when rainfall is intense, thereby reducing water erosion; 
and (iv) more crop residues restored to the soil, thereby replacing organic matter lost to 
cultivation. 
4.3.2. Centralization, Administration Costs, and Staff Composition 
TAC has recently discussed alternative institutional arrangements for the 
Centers in West Africa. The discussion appears to be a response to criticisms that: (i) the 
current structure is too centralized; (ii) its administration costs are too high; and (iii) its 
interactions with partners are not as efficient as they could be. 
How centralized are the IARCs in West Africa? 
The major IARCs in West Africa were more centralized in 1992 than in 1986, 
as defined by a diversity index lo The index was 0.66 in 1992 and 0.87 in 1986, as . 
calculated from the data in Table 4. Desk Study data show that 71.2 % of all West Africa 
CGIAR scientists were in Niger and Nigeria in 1992, compared to 29.2 % in 1986. (It is 
understood that not all IITA staff in Nigeria are at Ibadan, but most are). The closure of 
the IITA project in the Cameroon explains some of the difference between 1986 and 
1992. 
What are the costs and benefits of centralization? 
Costs. One cost of centralization is excess effort on the commodities and 
farming systems where scientists live. Its possible significance is indicated by the 
publications of IITA and ICFUSAT, by far the most important West African IARCs; they 
show that staff location affects research location, as indicated by where the published trial 
was conducted. The ICRISAT Sadore site represents perhaps 5 % of the West Africa 
semiarid tropics, but produces a much higher share of publications. The Panel talked 
about this cost with ICFUSAT groundnut scientists at Niamey. They note, correctly, that 
they have trials elsewhere in Niger and outside that country, which do not necessarily 
lead to published papers but which are a valuable counterweight to centralization. 
A second possible cost of centralization is the neglect of information, 
embodied in local plant materials for crop improvement, in data about hot spots for 
resistance screening, in the knowledge of national scientists and farmers, and in the 
characteristics of farming systems. Such costs may be high because of the variability in 
10 The diversity index is (l-(Ci((Xi/X)‘))), where Xi is the number of scientists in 
a country and X is the total number of scientists in a region. An index of 0 
means no diversity, or all staff at one site, and an index of 1 means full 
diversity. 
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regional farming systems and in the relative paucity of existing information about West 
African agriculture before about 1970. Every national program visited by the Panel stated 
that international research ignored some characteristics of local materials. ICRISAT millet 
improvement is said, by some NARS staff interviewed by the Panel, to have neglected 
local materials, who argued that this neglect explained that Center’s lack of impact (see 
section 4.10.2). IITA admitted that most farmers in northern Nigeria could not use its 
cowpea bred for solecropping with high pesticide inputs (IITA 1993a) and that this was 
partly due to a misperception of how those materials fit into the cropping system”. 
Benefits. The main benefit is that the facilities and staff at a central site--what 
is sometimes called critical mass-&mulate scientific output above what can be achieved 
by small groups of scientists. A second benefit is economies of scale in support facilities 
and social amenities. Many Center products--e.g., training and methods--are largely 
independent of where they are developed, but cannot be generated without support 
facilities. A third benefit--which we admit to be vague and hard to distinguish from the 
economies of scale effect--is that scientists in larger central programs have better 
incentives for productivity than do those in smaller orbital programs. 
Centralization is an issue only for IITA and ICRISAT as the other Centers are 
too small in West Africa to be affected by it. We do not think that it is a problem for 
IITA given its work in Benin, Cameroon, Cote d’Ivoire, and the spread of its activities 
across the varied climates of Nigeria itself; the last point is crucial and is often forgotten 
by IITA’s critics. With due regard for the benefits of centralization, we do think that 
ICRISAT’s effort in the Sahel has been too centralized, not because of size in and of 
itself, but because of the principal site location at Niamey. 
4.3.3. Administration Costs 
One assertion is that administration costs are too high in some Centers relative 
to the others. The Desk Study found significant differences among Centers in relative 
administration costs. The minima were IIMI and ILRAD (none) and the maxima were 
WARDA, IFPRI, IITA, and ICRISAT (28, 33, 38, and 43 % respectively). The range’ 
might indicate savings were the expensive centers to adopt the management practices of 
the cheap ones. 
The high administration cost centers are those with fixed assets, with the 
exception of IFPRI. How much do fixed assets contribute to administration costs? We 
first divided the cost of administration (column (1) in Table 8) by the total cost of the 
other three components (research, research support, and institution building), giving 
column (3); we then subtracted the annual amortization of each Center’s fixed assets from 
its administration costs (column (2)) and divided the remainder by the total cost of the 
other three components, giving column (4) below. Though this adjustment does not affect 
11 One cultivar was TVX3236, which the Impact Study counted as having “made 
a widespread impact” (Jahnke et al, 1985, p. 71). 
30 
the rankings, it does make the burden of administration at ICRISAT, IITA and WARDA 
look a bit lighter. 
Table 8 
Effect of fixed asset amortization 





Relative to total of 
other 3 categories 






































average 17,042 13,942 45% 37% 
Note: CIAT, IIMI, ILRAD and INIBAP reported no administrative costs. 
Source: Table 4. 
The Panel believes that some of those savings are spurious because some 
Centers provide services to others that are not reflected in the Desk Study averages. At 
Ibadan, IITA provides administrative services to ILCA, IRRI, ICRAF, and CIP. At 
Niamey, ICRISAT does the same for ICRAF, IFDC, and IFPRI. We expect that the same 
will eventually occur in the Cameroon as other Centers join ICRAF and IITA. At 
Ban&o, Kano, and Cotonou, ICRISAT or IITA give administrative aid to individual 
Center staff. The Panel concludes that a more accurate accounting of inter-center transfers 
would reduce some of the apparent dispersion in administrative costsl*. 
While part of the range among Centers is an artifact of different reporting 
practices--e.g. putting research costs under administration and vice versa--and another 
12 The Panel is not recommending more work to estimate these costs. 
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part is due to hidden transfers among Centers, it appears that administration costs of 
ICRISAT, IFPRI, and IITA are still high. In the instance of IFPRI, which has no fixed 
assets in West Africa, the high value is caused by its practice of calculating full overhead 
costs, a practice which is apparently not adhered to by some of the other Centers. 
Another assertion is that administration costs are higher than those of like 
institutions in the industrial countries. TAC has remarked (1994, p. 14): “The share of 
center governance and management costs in several centers seems to be high relative to 
comparable institutes outside the CGIAR.” According to this reasoning, savings could be 
had by adopting the management practices of such like institutes. 
The Panel does not have the resources to evaluate this argument in detail, as it 
would require a careful sampling of relevant like institutes, but it will say the following. 
(i) Some CGIAR administrative costs are dispensations to partners. The Centers manage 
donor funds for collaborative research with national or regional programs. They organize 
foreign travel, stipends, local transport and visas for trainees beyond what is accounted as 
training expenditures. The Centers organize various meetings and are, inevitably, the 
donor of last resort for minor expenses of all kinds. These costs appear as administration, 
yet they cannot be eliminated without harming partner relations. IITA training costs, in 
particular, are reported in its core expenditures for administration and general operations 
but include information services, which that Center contends is research support, not 
administration. (ii) Other administration costs are a fact of life in the tropics because of 
the high unit costs of transport, communications, information, banking, water, and power. 
High unit costs swell the share of administration because that activity uses more of those 
services than does research. (iii) With respect to infrastructure costs, TAC (1994, p. 17) 
notes that some Centers incur zero costs of physical plant operation because they use 
rented facilities in comparison to six others having infrastructure costs of more than 10% 
of total cost. This is not a just comparison unless the rented facilities are free. 
4.3.4. Staff Composition 
Another governance issue is staff composition. Some Panel interviewees 
recommended that the Centers have an explicit policy of hiring more regional scientists. 
The Panel strongly discourages an explicit regional staffing policy because it 
would interfere with the scientific independence of the IARCs. Moreover, no policy is 
necessary as regionalization of internationally recruited staff is occurring anyway, for 
good reasons. Those reasons include the greater numbers of qualified regional staff who, 
in the francophone countries, are becoming more competent in English. That regional 
staff stay longer in the region and in one center is a significant benefit because it reduces 
learning and other fixed costs per scientist. Regional staff are sometimes more effective 
because they have better language skills. These market forces will promote a progressive 
regionalization of scientists without an explicit staffing course. 
4.4. An Alternative Organization? 
TAC has outlined an alternative “to an ecoregional approach for research in 
West Africa [that] would consist of a decentralized network of the CGIAR activities” 
(TAC Secretariat, 1994: p. 26). A “coordinated set of decentralized but focused 
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programs” . . . would allow for a CGIAR presence in all the major agroecological zones of 
west and central Africa, a better integration of CGIAR research activities, and for a 
coordinated network program in both the francophone and anglophone countries of the 
sub-region” (Ibid). 
The Panel contends that the “decentralized network” alternative would be 
inefficient for three reasons. We assume that a decentralized network would consist of 
administratively separate partners (eg , international scientists, NARS , non-governmental 
organizations, the private sector) with access to common funds in place of the center 
model. 
b We note TAC’s point (TAC, 1994, p. 6) that the original objectives of the 
CGIAR did not refer to Centers as such. But institutions like the Centers exist partly to 
minimize the information and procedural costs needed to allocate resources and to impose 
accountability. Any institution or decentralized network incurs the same costs. Minimizing 
them in a network requires agreed rules on size and activities. As the network grows it 
becomes harder to impose those rules without a stable bureaucracy. The evolution of the 
Centers as independent entities, instead of acephalous programs, is a telling example of 
how the costs of information shape institutions. 
b Institutions also exist to minimize the costs of uncertainty about markets, or 
in this example, about the resources available and accountability. A decentralized 
network, unless it has fixed rules like those of a more structured institution, risks being 
subject to arbitrary decisions as a way of managing uncertainty. 
b The suggested benefits of the decentralized network approach--presence in 
all ecoregions of West Africa, integration of CGIAR activities and a coordinated program 
of anglophone and francophone activities--are already gained in the Centers or in related 
efforts, notably that of SPAAR. Networks, collaborative trials and joint studies (e.g. 
COSCA) give substantial presence across the various ecoregions. CGIAR activities are 
integrated in a plethora of consultations among Centers and with their partners. While 
coordination among anglophone and francophone activities is not what it might be, the 
evolution of relations between the two groups of countries is rapid enough that no major 
change in the roles of the Centers is needed to promote it. 
4.4.1. A Common WARDA and IITA Board 
The Panel proposes a common Board of Trustees for WARDA and IITA as a 
means of harmonizing research between the two institutions13. It should not be yet 
another regional. organization because of the risks of political interference; The Panel 
recommends that (i) a Common Board be created from the existing Boards of IITA and 
WARDA; (ii) two ICRISAT, one IRRI, and one ICRAF Board members serve as 
ex-oficio members of the Common Board; (iii) the size of the Common Board not exceed 
13 In an earlier draft of this Report, we committed the error of justifying this 
common Board in terms of cost savings, which we now recognize to be 
unimportant. 
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half that of the combined existing Boards of IITA and WARDA; and (iv) the WARDA 
Council of Ministers serve in an advisory capacity to the Common Board, without 
specific recognition in the constitution of any Center except WARDA. 
4.5. Devolution 
The evolution of some national programs logically shifts the comparative 
advantage of the Centers in germplasm enhancement and breeding, production system and 
management, and institution building. 
4.5.1. Germplasm Enhancement and Breeding 
Germplasm enhancement and breeding (CGIAR activity category 2) took about 
19.8 % of Center commitments in 1986 and 22.0 % in 1992 (Table 4)14. This compares 
to 49.3 % and 35.6% for production systems and management (Category 3) in 1986 and 
1992, respectively. Resources allocated to Category 2 are insufficient despite the shifts 
among categories from 1986 to 1992. 
b Germplasm enhancement and breeding have been and continue to be the 
main sources of total factor productivity gains from international agricultural research. 
F The natural resources benefits of research in Category 2 are important, as 
discussed in section 4.3.1. 
F The national programs can now do much more in Category 3, as discussed 
in section 4.7. 
F Even if institution building is (properly) understood as being mainly 
training, competing suppliers--bilateral development projects and universities in 
particular--exist. The Centers have a specific comparative advantage in some aspects of 
training, and ISNAR has one in institutional development, but neither is exclusive. It 
should be possible to transfer resources from Category 5 to Category 2. 
There are two other major issues in Category 2 in addition to the quantity of 
resources: overall research strategy and the degree to which commodity commitments 
can be devolved to national or regional programs. 
Research Strategy 
Opportunity costs of hybrids vs varieties. Hybrid and variety development 
share costs--farm overhead, labs, computing, support staff--that can be reallocated among 
research products and the intermediate products of differing strategies can be adapted to 
variety or hybrid breeding. Hence the tradeoffs of one strategy against the other in terms 
of short-run financial cost may not be very large. 
14 The shares for all Centers in 1992 (Table 5) do not differ. 
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The tradeoffs in terms of long-run economic cost may be much greater. The 
assumption that hybrids are too expensive for small farmers has retarded improvement of 
maize, sorghum, and perhaps millet. Yet the yield gain from hybrids may now be too 
large to ignore. ICRISAT staff at Kano argue that a stable yield gain of 25 percent of 
sorghum hybrids over varieties is feasible in farmers’ conditions, a gain which would 
easily pay for the additional seed and, if projected on even a small area, would pay 
aggregate research costs. 
The assumption that hybrid seed is too risky for small farmers has also been 
used to justify emphasis on varieties. However, the risks of seed supply are best judged 
by the farmers themselves, not by international researchers. It is inefficient for the IARCs 
to neglect hybrids as a research strategy on the grounds that seed supply is uncertain 
given that they are necessarily less well-placed than farmers to judge the costs of 
uncertainty over time. 
While we understand the argument that private sector companies will generate 
hybrids in the long-run--and have specifically said what we think the system can do to 
encourage private sector development for all types of agricultural technology (section 
3.2)--in the short run we contend that there should be more emphasis on hybrids. 
Finished vs intermediate products. There is a broad consensus that Center 
crop improvement programs should not produce finished materials. At the same time, the 
small national programs are too weak to do so. That weakness, which also occurs 
sporadically in many countries that are otherwise strong, puts pressure on the Centers to 
help the weaker countries by providing them with finished materials (and other assistance) 
that they would not normally furnish. This is a specific instance of the small country 
problem. 
The longer-term way to help weak countries is through bilateral programs that 
emphasize academic training, which is how the stronger national programs developed 
their capacities in the first place. The shorter-term solutions are through regional 
networks on the SPAAR model (eg, millet, cowpea, and sorghum) which give materials 
at various levels of testing and through relations with larger national programs (eg, 
Nigeria with Togo and Benin, Senegal or Mali with Mauritania, the Gambia, and 
Guinea-Bissau, Ghana with Sierra Leone). The need to assist the weaker national 
programs by providing finished materials should not broadly justify provision of finished 
products to national programs. 
4.6. Devolution of Specific Commodities 
Devolution of research to national programs has long been a system objective. 
An example is the transfer of faba bean to Morocco from ICARDA after the 1988 EPR of 
the latter. What are the possibilities for devolution of germplasm enhancement and 
breeding in West Africa? 
Candidates for devolution should: (i) be important in West Africa, but less 
important elsewhere, to maximize the benefits to regional research while minimizing the 
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costs of research foregone outside the region; (ii) have existing regional research 
capacity, to avoid a lengthy transition to new institutions with high initial costs; and (iii) 
have existing regional research results, to promote confidence among the donors 
providing the necessary transitional finance. 
Taking the major Center crops of the region--millet, sorghum, rice, maize, 
groundnut, cowpea, cassava, and yam--rice, sorghum, groundnut, and cassava can be 
excluded because of their extraregional importance. Maize has been devolved to IITA, 
which has small programs in crop improvement and management of the crop. IITA has 
already considered abandoning humid forest zone maize research (but not Savannah maize 
research) and the Institute’s next external review should investigate this possibility 
(section 5 on recommendations about individual Centers). Millet is not a good candidate 
for devolution partly because of its extraregional importance but mainly because years of 
effort have not produced really significant field results, suggesting that more basic 
research is needed. A revised role for the IARCs in millet is already evolving in the 
SPAAR framework. 
Arguments for devolution of cowpea. Cowpea is a more logical candidate. 
West Africa produces much of the world’s cowpea and Nigeria is perhaps the leading 
world producer. There is regional research capacity and there have been some (limited) 
results. Cowpea is almost never the major crop in a farming system. The institutional 
basis for devolution exists in the SPAAR framework for the Sahel. The Panel interviewed 
NARS and IARC staff about the possibility of devolving cowpea research to a national 
program in the region. The chief barrier to devolution was said to be lack of money. 
Arguments against devolution of cowpea. The most telling financial 
argument against devolution is that the cost of international cowpea research is small. 
IITA staff also report that the NARS are unable to carry out strategic biotechnological 
research on insect problems in cowpea and that significant cowpea germplasm exchange 
outside West Africa might be disrupted if full responsibility for the crop were to be 
abandoned by IITA. Cowpea is said to be growing in importance as a legume in 
cereal-legume (green manure) rotations in irrigated farming areas of Asia and 
international research is thought to be needed for those areas. Panel interviewees noted 
that the attempt to devolve yam research from IITA to Nigeria had failed; while this 
unsuccessful precedent does not mean that the effort is impossible, it does suggest that the 
essential condition of a strong and stable national program has not been met. 
The Panel recommends that cowpea germplasm research not be devolved to 
the region. The cost savings--3.25 SSYs annually in IITA-‘s 1994-98 MTP in a total of 99 
SSYs (IITA 1992, p. 117) --are small compared to the foregone benefits of research on 
the crop within and outside West Africa. IITA’s cowpea responsibilities do not interfere 
with national or regional activities in West Africa. They produce benefits outside the 
region that could not be captured by other existing arrangements. The Panel’s 
recommended devolution of production systems and management research (category 3) to 
the region would in effect devolve much cowpea research because that crop is by far the 
most important grain and dual purpose legume. 
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4.7. Production Systems And Management Research 
The leaders in production systems research (CGIAR activity category 
3--Production System Development and Management) are IITA, ICRISAT, and WARDA 
who contributed about 385 SSM to the 1992 total of 456 SSM. The 1992 ecoregional 
breakdown was 74% humid and 26 % semiarid (62 % and 38 % , respectively, in 1986). 
The 1992 total was less than half of the 1986 figure of 912 SSM (Table 9). 
Should more of activity 3 be devolved to the national programs? The case for 
devolving this activity is stronger than that for devolving a commodity. First, many 
efforts in category 3 have failed to produce appreciable benefits in output: prominent 
examples are ICRISAT operational-scale trials at Niamey, IITA alley farming research at 
Ibadan, and ICRISAT intercropping work in Mali l5 ILCA systems characterization in , 
Mali, and the SAFGRAD farming systems effort in West Africa. This argues for shifting 
the work to where it is cheaper. Second, activity 3 is often site-specific and does not 
produce international benefits. Third, the national program can now do the work. In many 
instances, what the Centers do is not different from what national programs do. 
The Panel recommends that activity category 3 be the subject of an explicit 
devolution policy in IITA and ICRISAT. WARDA’s size imposes on it a mode of 
operation that amounts to such a devolution in practice; were WARDA to expand in this 
category, then this recommendation ought to apply explicitly to WARDA as well. ICRAF 
and ILCA are special cases because they work on trees and livestock, in which it is 
recognized that the national programs are weaker and in which, moreover, there is less 
that the Centers can do in activities 1 and 2. The other centers either have no work in 
category 3 (IPGRI, IFPRI, ISNAR), or do little in West Africa (ICLARM,‘IIMI, CIP, 
CIAT, CIMMYT). 
We earlier anticipated several objections to this recommendation. 
b ” IARC research in category 3 produces output benefits. ” Yet the Impact 
Study and Centers’ accounts of their impact in West Africa show that it has not. A recent 
symposium (Oehmke and Crawford, 1993) on research impact in Africa refers almost 
exclusively to crop improvement, not to production systems or crop management. A 
careful review of humid West and Central Africa concludes that “evidence of adoption of 
specific cultural practices recommended by research is extremely scant” (Bose and Freud 
1993, p. 6), gives examples of the shift to monocropping from intercropping, plant 
spacing, weeding, and harvesting. A detailed study in a highly productive irrigated 
environment of Mexico where HYVs of wheat are universal (Traxler and Byerlee, 1992) 
shows the same thing. We do not denigrate the value of better understanding of complex 
production systems, which requires category 3 research, but it has been very difficult to 
convert that understanding into higher output through production systems and management 
research and the IARCs have to recognize this. 
15 There are reports of some adoption of improved intercropping techniques in 
central Mali. 
TABLE 9: Ecoregional and Country Distribution of CGIAR Activity 3 in West Africa, 1992 (Senior Staff -Months) 
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b “If this work does not produce benefits, then why should anyone do it?” 
The net benefits can be greater in the national programs, which cost less. Moreover, if 
the Centers deemphasize part of this category then the question of continuing with it 
becomes an internal issue for the national systems. 
b “Complementarities among crop improvement research, production systems 
and management research require them to be done jointly in one institution.” Those 
complementarities, deriving from the strong interaction between crop improvement and 
system management in tropical agriculture, are important. Failure to understand them 
explains some of the delay in extending modem agriculture to West Africa. Centers 
adopting pertinent aspects of the open center model, however, can achieve those 
complementarities at lower cost by collaboration between national and international 
institutions in which the latter have principal responsibility for crop improvement and the 
former for production systems and the interactions between new plant materials and 
cropping practices (section 5). 
b “It has already been done.” For West Africa, the number of IARC SSM in 
category 3 was 912 in 1986 and the 1992 figure was 420. CIMMYT’s response to 
financial stringency has been to “protect . . . plant breeding . . . at the expense of crop 
management research, training, networking, and various support activities. ” (CGIAR 
1994a, p. 2). 
b “There is little to devolve because IITA and ICRISAT spending for 
category 3 is small to begin with; the cuts from 1986 to 1992 for category 3 reduced it to 
a strict minimum.” Objections 4 and 5 are valid. They impose a careful interpretation of 
the recommendation. Spending on category 3 is small because of funding cuts in the two 
leading Centers. Therefore, the additional envelopes for IITA and ICRISAT above their 
bases, if they are available in the current MTP periods, should not be allocated 
proportionately across the five categories. They should be distributed almost exclusively 
to categories 1 and 2 (Conservation and management of Natural Resources and 
Germplasm enhancement and breeding). If the 1994-98 MTPs of IITA and ICRISAT are 
maintained at the base envelope, then reallocations should be made from Category 3 in 
ICRISAT Asia Center to Categories 1 and 2 in West Africa. 
What should be the mechanism to devolve Category 3? The cuts in Center 
funding for category 3 naturally mean that there is less to devolve, but the principles need 
to be stated clearly. The Panel proposes that: 
b The rule should be to emphasize strategic and process-oriented research in 
the IARCs in Category 3, and to devolve site-specific production systems research. 
Examples of strategic and process oriented research include studies of mechanisms to 
transfer nutrients among crops, trees, and animals. 
b Centers and national programs develop long-term joint programs in which 
the IARCs are broadly responsible for categories 1 and 2 and the NARS are responsible 
for category 3. 
b Those programs have strict calendars to shift tasks among partners. 
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b During the transition periods, the Centers’ funding would be from their own 
core, with appropriate reallocations from category 3, including transfers from Asia in the 
case of ICRISAT. 
b The NARS funding would be from special projects developed, maintained 
and managed entirely by themselves. 
b A competitive process for allocating funds is undesirable. It would cause 
more problems than it would solve because of differing capacities of the NARS and 
because of different access to Center facilities for joint work. Mali and Nigeria might 
reasonably be expected to win every competition. Niger and Nigeria might have 
preferential access to IITA and ICRISAT. Without true competition, a consensus 
approach like the SPAAR model is best to allocate sites, responsibilities and funds. 
b To ensure accountability without a fully competitive allocation process, the 
category 3 activities under this new mechanism, including those of the NARS, would be 
evaluated with current external review procedures. NARS participation would be 
conditional on full agreement and cooperation with external review procedures, including 
the possibility that funding would be eliminated for non-performance. 
b Given the development of the national programs, and the volume of 
existing knowledge about regional agriculture, cropping systems work in all the IARCs 
should be much more basic, with development of computer models of multiple cropping 
(sequential, catch, relay, mixed and row) and soil-water-plant interactions, to reduce the 
cost of field resources needed for actual experiments. 
4.8. Institution Building 
The root institutional weakness of the NARS is flimsy political commitment to 
research and extension. It manifests itself in: (i) inability to nurture strong national 
institutions to replace the departed colonial ones; (ii) lack of qualified staff (though this is 
improving quickly); (iii) arbitrary political interference in national institutions, for 
example rapid turnover of unqualified managers and institutions larded with 
administrators; (iv) weak and variable funding, especially of operating costs, as seen in 
the decline in average spending per scientist at a time of rapid growth in numbers of 
scientists; and (v) indifference or hostility to non-public institutions, such as private seed 
companies and farmers’ organizations, that elsewhere promote agricultural technology 
generation and transfer. 
What are the Centers doing directly about institutional development? With the 
evident exception of ISNAR, the IARCs do little in institutional building as such in West 
Africa. .Much of what is termed capacity building is really training and information. 
IITA’s 1994-98 MTP proposes US$200,000 annually for organization and management 
counseling, or 0.8 % of its 100 % base envelope; the remaining US$2.075 million in 
Category 5 (8.4% of the base envelope) is for training, conferences, and information 
services (IITA 1992, p. 117). ICRISAT’s 1994-98 MTP proposes nothing for 
organization and management counseling but 15.6 % of the MTP total for institutional 
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building, most of which is training, information, and networks (ICRISAT 1992, Table 3). 
The Panel expects no significant savings from cutting Centers’ activities in institution 
building as such. 
What should the Centers do about institutional development? The IARCs 
neglect of institution building as such is wholly justified. With the evident exception of 
ISNAR, the Centers have no comparative advantage in institution building, which requires 
greater resources, a wider perspective, and political reforms that they cannot effect. 
Examples of what the IARCs cannot do are in the Senegal - Second Agricultural Research 
Project, which is supported by the World Bank and is representative of the deeper 
institutional changes needed to make national research more effective. The project: (i) 
provides major financial support to the NARS; (ii) strengthens administrative and 
financial management of the NARS; (iii) strengthens linkages among research, extension 
and farmers; (iv) establishes a commercial production company to manage 
revenue-earning activities of the NARS; (v) funds special projects that arise unexpectedly; 
and (vi) prepares a detailed staff development plan. 
A rare exception is research station development. In three instances of which 
the Panel is aware (Cinzana, Mali; Bengou, Niger; and Kano, Nigeria) such assistance 
has been: (i) specifically requested by the national program; (ii) the beneficiary of special 
funding; and (iii) done at a site useful to the Center’s research. These individual 
opportunities will necessarily become less common as the facilities in each country 
mature. They should only be part of broad Center assistance to station development 
through ISNAR. 
4.9. Training 
Several reviews have detected possible savings in consolidating similar training 
activities. This argument has merit and it is one on which the Centers are acting. As 
noted in the Desk Study, there have been some joint training courses, and a Training 
Directors proposal to make IARC training more cost-effective. The Training Directors of 
IITA and ILCA have written a proposal for an “Inter-Center Training Program for 
sub-Saharan Africa”. The proposal seeks to: (i) establish common procedures for 
managing CGIAR training in West Africa; (ii) provide training on integration themes (eg, 
crop-livestock-tree interactions); and (iii) share facilities for training and publications. The 
subject seems adequately treated by these initiatives and we have nothing to add, 
4.10. Relations with Partners 
The principal partners are the national agricultural research institutes, always 
the main branch of the NARS, farmers, private companies, NGOs, and universities, both 
national and foreign, and independent research institutes. Are IARC relations with 
partners efficient? We define efficient as: (i) informing the Centers about what the NARS 
do and need in full and timely fashion; (ii) creating a partnership in which the presence of 
the Centers does not smother the national associate or displace what the national programs 
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can and should do on their own; and (iii) maintaining scientific freedom and standards in 
the Centers without excessive bureaucracy. 
4.10.1. Summary of NARS’ Views on IARC Interactions 
The Panel met NARS administrators and scientists in Mali, Burkina Faso, 
Niger, Nigeria, Benin, Ghana, and the Cameroon to have their views on relations with 
the IARCs. We first report, in a slightly altered paraphrase, written remarks from the 
Institute of Agricultural Research and Training (IAR&T) of Nigeria, because they 
represent many other comments, before summarizing Panel interviews with other NARS 
representatives. 
Observations of IAR&T, Nigeria 
1. Geographic mandate of IARCs is too broad (example of IITA). 
2. IARCs fail to recognize contributions of national programs. 
3. IARCs fail to use farming system research (eg, earlier IITA work on mechanization 
and high-input using cultivars). 
4. IARC staff are sometimes unreceptive to views of national program scientists. 
5. There is a lack of formal interaction between IARCs and NARS. 
6. Discriminatory conditions of service between national and international scientists in the 
IARCs are a disincentive for the former to work in the IARCs. 
7. Incursion of IARCs into the national extension system creates problems for the NARS, 
e.g. in providing free inputs in an unsustainable manner. 
8. Donor politics affect research (e.g., reduction of soybean research due to pressure 
from a donor). 
9. There are duplicative efforts because of donor influence (eg, CORAF and SAFGRAD). 
10. There are high administration charges levied by the IARCs on donor funds used in 
collaboration with NARS. 
4.10.2. Observations of other NARS in Panel Interviews 
We summarize these remarks by a few chief themes, defining areas in which 
one might expect minor or major disagreement between the IARCs and the NARS. 
Role and mandate of IARCs 
Minor or no disagreement expected 
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1. IARC research should be basic/strategic or applied. 
2. An appropriate role of the IARCs is to develop new research methods. 
3. Extension (eg, varietal release) is a national role. 
4. Exchange of scientists between NARS and IARCs is necessary to strengthen 
collaboration. 
5. Active involvement of NARS is needed in formulation of the research 
agenda of the IARCs. 
5. IARCs should assist the institutional development of national programs. 
Major disagreement expected 
1. Agronomy, including adaptation trials and crop utilization, 
should be handled largely by NARS with IARCs collaborating. The Panel believes that 
the highly site-specific character of agronomy makes it a candidate for devolution to the 
NARS and has proposed a mechanism to do this (see section 4.5). 
2. There has been a lack of local partnership in breeding programs (eg, in 
Burkina). Finished products, not breeding materials, are sent to NARS for testing. There 
are conflicts over materials to include in trials. IARC breeders are not open enough to 
local materials in collaborative trials. The Panel makes no recommendation about this 
point. We believe that the NARS view is not well justified or is something ‘of minor 
importance that it can be dealt with in the existing IARC-NARS consultation mechanisms 
in West Africa. 
3. IARCs too often duplicate what the national programs do. The national 
program of Niger cited the example of crop residue management, and cropping practices 
agronomy. 
Collaboration with national programs 
Major disagreement expected 
1. The IARCs have failed to heed national needs. Examples cited in Mali were 
impact evaluation and natural resources research. 
2. Competition for research funds with the IARCs has damaged the national 
programs. 
Organization of the IARCs in West Africa 
Minor disagreement expected 
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NAILS. 
1. Bilateral programs are necessary at an initial stage in the growth of the 
2, Program instability has damaged the IARCs (Mali, citing case of ILCA). 
Governance 
Minor or no disagreement expected 
1. Regional centers should be established to address problems across ecological zones (eg, 
West Africa). 
Major disagreement expected 
1. The regional centers should be manned by nationals. There is a need to 
strengthen research by involving nationals. 
2. IARCs are too independent. 
3. There is no functional means of linking IARCs to national priorities. Board 
representation is inadequate. External reviews every 5 years are too infrequent. Annual 
program reviews and other seminars and workshops are partial. Malian scientists state 
that they had too little input into ILCA research programs. 
4. IARC recruitment of regional scientists sometimes favor inexperienced over 
experienced staff. 
Other issues 
Minor disagreement expected 
1. CGIAR should pressure NARS governments to allocate adequate funds to 
research. 
Funding 
Minor disagreement expected 
1. The funding of the IARCs should be conditioned on results. 
2. A more competitive funding system is required. 
3. The CGIAR should work on new crops, such as cotton, other cash crops in 
the humid zone, or novel species. 
Impact 
Major disagreement expected 
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1. There has been little effect of IARC-generated varieties. The examples of 
IITA and ICRISAT (Burkina) and ICRISAT research on millet in Niger were cited. 
2. Livestock research has been very weak (Burkina and Mali). 
Relations with other NARS partners 
Major disagreement expected 
1. Contacts with farmers. Center contacts with farmers should not compete 
with national research and extension. But it is undesirable to set strict and general rules 
that would not unnecessarily interfere with good science by center staff. The main reason 
is that farmer contacts, usually through surveys and on-farm experiments, provide 
valuable information to the IARCs. After all, if one really accepts the criticism that the 
IARCs have neglected local farming systems, the only just rebuttal is to study those 
systems. 
2. The private commercial sector. National programs in some instances have 
sought to limit IARC contacts with the private commercial sector on the grounds that the 
IARCs are working for the NARS, not for profit-making companies. 
Panel’s comments on those views 
The Panel has tried to make a careful evaluation of these observations without 
going over the details of each instance, and without taking sides. We present here only 
our comments on the major disagreements (previous section), referring to other sections 
where we have made recommendations. We have at each point tried to synthesize 
recommendations that would be broadly applicable to all Centers in West Africa. 
Africa 
Major disagreements about the Role and Mandate of the Centers in West 
1. Agronomy/production systems research. The Panel has recommended a 
mechanism for devolution of category 3 (section 4.7.). 
2. Partnership in breeding. Conflicts in breeding are perhaps more frequent 
than in other fields because of competition for scientific rewards. That competition is the 
root of this disagreement. But there is a wide variety of existing mechanisms to eliminate 
it or manage it at any rate and we see no reason to propose others. There is, in 
particular, enough commonality between the WARDA model and those used by IITA and 
ICRISAT that nothing would be gained by imposing the former model on the other 
Centers. 
3. Duplication. The national program of Niger cited the examples of crop 
residue management and cropping practices agronomy, which have been discussed in the 
comments on Category 3 research. 
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4. Institutional development. The Panel has made specific recommendations 
about training and other actions in the general rubric of institutional development (section 
4.4.3). 
Major disagreements about collaboration with national programs 
1. The IARCs have failed to heed national priorities. The principal 
criticism made by national program staff to the Panel is that the Centers do not consider 
national priorities when establishing their programs. After serious consideration, we have 
decided that the criticism is not generally valid enough to warrant a generic change in the 
operation of the Centers. 
b Many formal mechanisms exist and the subject has been discussed 
exhaustively. ICRISAT has a written agreement with INRAN, which also has parallel 
agreements with ICRAF and ILCA, among others. IAR has written agreements with 
ICRISAT and with IITA. IITA publishes the results of a week-long meeting with Nigerian 
research directors in which priorities are thoroughly covered (IITA 1993b). In Nigeria, 
all ICRISAT staff are part of IAR programs (eg, farming systems research, cereals, and 
food science) that are governed by committees that meet twice-yearly to review and plan 
work. 
b There will always be conflicts about priorities, but these can only be 
efficiently resolved case by case. 
w The international mandate of the Centers is not always going to be 
perfectly consistent with national mandates in the regional; this is the reason for its 
existence. 
2. Competition for research funds with the IARCs has damaged the 
national programs. 
b We see more justice in this argument and Evenson’s results bear the 
possibility that this damage could worsen as the NARS grow. That we find some merit in 
this argument should not be construed as saying that the way to strengthen the NARS is 
to limit competition for funds; what needs to be done is to strengthen their ability to 
compete. We have recommended a new mechanism to jointly allocate funds for 
production system and management research (section 4.7.). 
Major disagreements about Governance 
1. The regional centers should more often be staffed by nationals at the 
scientific level. 
b The Panel has explicitly rejected this suggestion (section 4.3.2). 
2. There is no functional means of linking IARCs to national priorities. 
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b Some NARS said Board representation is inadequate. The risk of increasing 
regional Board representation is of course that of political interference and the Panel does 
not accept it. 
b Other NARS said external reviews every 5 years are too infrequent. These 
external reviews are complemented by many other reviews, some with external 
participation. The external reviews, and the visits of Panels like this one, impose costs on 
the Centers that should not be increased further. 
b Joint work is the best functional means of linking the different levels of the 
research system. The proposed devolution of much of Category 3 to the NARS from the 
IARCs is such a means in addition to the many existing ones. 
Impact 
Major disagreement expected 
1. There has been little effect of INK-generated varieties. 
w This is a Sahelian observation and ICRISAT accepts that it is at least partly 
true. We have made a recommendation about ICRISAT’s crop improvement programs 
(see section 5.6.1). 
v While it is too early to gauge the success of the new WARDA, we have 
discussed the criterion by which that Center’s impact should be judged (Annex 1 on 
WARDA). 
2. Livestock research has been weak and has had no production impact. 
This observation was made in Burkina, Mali, and Nigeria. IER in Mali condemned the 
ILCA/Mali semiarid program (1975-1985) for having produced only publications in lieu 
of results that might lift productivity. 
b The system as a whole has to concede that this is true. The Panel discusses 
the reasons why and makes some recommendations in Section 5 on the future of ILRI. 
Relations with other NARS partners 
Major disagreement 
1. Contacts with farmers. There is in fact no major disagreement with the 
principle that Center contacts with farmers should not compete with national research and 
extension, but there are many specific squabbles. We conclude strongly that it is 
inefficient to set strict and general rules about contacts with farmers because they would 
interfere with good science by center staff. Farmer contacts, usually through surveys and 
on-farm experiments, do provide valuable information to the IARCs; after all, if one 
really accepts the criticism that the IARCs have neglected local farming systems, their 
only just rebuttal is to study those systems. 
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2. Contacts with the private commercial sector. National programs in some 
instances have sought to limit IARC contacts with the private commercial sector on the 
grounds that the IARCs are working for the NARS, not for profitable companies. The 
Panel makes two recommendations here, one about markets for intellectual property and 
the other about genetic resources exports (section 5). 
4.11. Impact Analysis 
Impact analysis (IA) is any technique used to measure the consequences of a 
center’s work on commodity output, information, or its partners. Ex-post IA gauges 
impact of known technology or information on actual output at the farm or aggregate 
level. A common application is to estimate the fate of planting materials. The standard 
procedure is to gather farm data to: (i) estimate the area covered by new material; (ii) 
calculate the additional yield of the new material compared to traditional materials or to 
previous generations of improved materials; (iii) value the calculated incremental output at 
market or international prices; and (iv) compare that value to the costs of the research and 
extension needed to generate it. A variant is a study of cassava mealybug control under 
the auspices of IITA (Norgaard, 1988) which used more qualitative estimates of yield 
effects. 
Gathering base data. The main techniques are household surveys and rapid 
appraisal. The former usually: (i) has fewer sample units; (ii) employs more formal 
sampling procedures; (iii) asks more questions and in more detail; (iv) is less fixed on 
agricultural technology; (v) employs more quantitative methods, notably econometric, 
optimization, and simulation; (vi) may last for several years in the same households; and 
(vii) may cost more per sample unit because of the longer lag to produce results. IITA, 
ICRISAT, IFPRI, and WARDA have collected farm data at varying sites and locations, 
and have analyzed some of it with a view to estimating ex-post research impact. 
Trials and information analysis. Economic analysis is done of station or 
farm trials. This can include analysis of breeding programs, distribution of intermediate 
materials, and publications analysis. Statistical analysis is done of the production function 
for publications and of the effect of publications on the rate of commodity or total output 
growth. 
Analyses of scientific impact. Scientific impact, defined as the growth in the 
production of knowledge, is distinguished from production impact, for two reasons. First, 
scientific impact offers a check on progress in technical variables that cannot be easily 
measured on farm for cost or statistical reasons. Such variables could include average 
disease scores in a crop improvement program, yield potential, and estimates of genetic 
heritabilities of animal traits. Second, there are sometimes good reasons outside the 
research domain that some truly profitable farm technologies are not adopted. Where 
those reasons exist, they impede the research system from judging the true rate of 
technical change and justify scientific impact as a legitimate scale. 
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4.11.1. Ex-ante Impact Analysis 
Ex-ante IA measures the weight of a technology that has not been adopted, but 
whose cost, productivity effect, and adoption can be projected with some precision. It is 
typically an aggregate technique because of the need to calculate the adoption parameters 
required to repay the costs of research and extension. There has been, however, at least 
one farm-level application by. ICRISAT to the demand for striga control methods on 
sorghum in Mali. 
The Panel perceives some weaknesses in this area. 
b The Centers active in West Africa, with the prominent exception of 
ICRISAT and the lesser one of WARDA (e.g. Becker and Diallo, 1992), do not use 
impact evaluation, ex-ante or ex-post, to allocate resources. 
b Impact work is dissociated from food and agricultural policy in generali6. 
A prime example is the failure of the commodity/ecoregional Centers to absorb the 
lessons from IFPRI’s work on cereals policy for conclusions about the size, nature, or 
priorities of national or international research. 
b The Centers do not evaluate the scientific impact of their work. They have 
nothing, for example, as straightforward as CIMMYT’s work on wheat varieties 
(CIMMYT, 1993) or as exotic as the literature on the benefits of conserving biodiversity. 
b The principal long-term village studies, those of ILCA and ICRISAT in 
Niger, are not well coordinated despite having similar purposes and common methods in 
the same production system17. 
b The ICRISAT village-level studies--done in Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso 
at various times since 1980--have no comparative focus in assisting impact evaluation, nor 
do those of ILCA (Mali, Niger and Cote d’Ivoire). 
b Calculations of losses to insects, diseases, parasitic weeds are too simple, 
arbitrary, or both. The treasury of information available from station observations has 
never been systematically exploited for any commodity or pest. 
It is difficult to separate observations about impact analysis from those about 
economics research in general and so we may be accused of exceeding our terms of 
reference in this matter. For that reason, we add several remarks that seem pertinent 
before presenting our recommendations. 
16 ISNAR series on structural adjustment and agricultural research, with chapters 
on Burkina Faso and Ghana (Tabor, forthcoming 1995). 
17 IFPRI had village studies in Niger with a different purpose, requiring a 
discrete sample. 
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b IITA, ICRISAT, WARDA and ILCA have few economists in West Africa, 
making it difficult to work on many issues and isolating the economists to some degree. 
Economics and policy research (CGIAR Activity Category 4) took only 7.7 % of major 
IARC staff time in 1986 and 3.6 % in 1992. We are not recommending that staffing for 
this activity be expanded, but it has to be managed innovatively and that does not seem to 
be the case now. 
b Regional economics capacities are weaker than in South Asia or Latin 
America. Center economists must have a larger presence in West Africa. 
b Some of the Centers’ programs duplicate what the development banks or the 
universities do. 
In light of these weaknesses, we recommend that IFPRI be named as a strong 
convening Center for socioeconomics, policy and public management research (CGIAR 
activity category 4) in West Africa in order to integrate the microeconomic focus of the 
commodity centers with its own policy focus. The mechanism is that: (i) all Center social 
science programs in West Africa, including those of ISNAR, would be prepared in a 
common process; (ii) an IFPRI staff member, one of two to be based preferably in 
Nigeria, manage the process; (iii) all special project funding for those programs, 
including post-doctoral fellows and students, be prepared jointly; and the regional effort 
not compromise the size of IARC efforts in Category 4. We understand that relevant 
collaboration already exists between IFPRI and ILCA on livestock policy research, and 
between IITA and its COSCA partners, but do not believe that this collaboration has 
produced the quality and coverage of research needed. The proposal creates the potential 
for a conflict of IFPRI’s interest as the convener and as a research institute, but the other 
participating Centers will just have to fight for their interests in this category. 
In opposing the preceding recommendation, IFPRI argued that “pulling all 
social science work into a system-wide effort with IFPRI as the convener is unlikely to 
likely to result in insufficient microeconomic analysis needed to be undertaken in close 
interaction with biological sciences. ” IFPRI did suggest it could be a “convener of social 
and policy research that does not fall into the category of micro work . . . in close 
collaboration with biological scientists”. ICRISAT contended that “social science 
leadership is developed within each Center to respond to Center priorities and the 
demands of multidisciplinary research”. 
We maintain the original recommendation. We add that: i) much of the basis 
of policy research is in fact microeconomic work in collaboration with the natural 
scientists; after all, if one wants to estimate the effects of fertilizer subsidies, it is 
imperative to know the response functions and if one wants to incorporate micronutrients 
as a crop improvement factor, then it is imperative to know about the systems in which 
those crops are grown; ii) it is entirely possible to maintain the microeconomic and 
multidisciplinary focus of social science work in the commodity Centers under the general 
responsibility of IFPRI; in fact, one of the weaknesses of current arrangements is the lack 
of such integration; iii) making IFPRI a limited convener is not likely to have an effect 
on the behavior of the commodity Centers and bears the risk of encouraging the latter to 
abandon this area altogether; and iv) what is needed is a series of studies--ranging from 
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economic analysis of experiments to policy analyses across countries--developed and 
managed jointly under the leadership of IFPRI that would make up a regional program. 
5. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Here we repeat the main questions and summarize the Panel’s answers and 
recommendations with appropriate illustrations from individual centers. Where we lack 
adequate information on some issues to present justifiable recommendations, we note the 
issue as one for future external review in the recommendations about individual centers in 
the following section. 
5.1. The Evolution of the National Programs and the Role of the Centers 
In view of the growing strength of the national programs, the Panel 
recommends shifting more Center effort to basic and strategic research. 
Conservation and management of natural resources; and Germplasm 
enhancement and breeding (Categories 1 and 2). The Panel recommends that IITA and 
ICRISAT shift resources into these categories out of Category 3. The other Centers, 
including WARDA, do so little in West Africa that this recommendation cannot 
practically apply to them. 
Production systems and management research (Category 3). The Panel 
recommends that activity category 3 be the subject of an explicit devolution policy in 
IITA and ICRISAT in order to augment work in Categories 1 and 2. 
Institution building (Category 5). The Panel recommends that the activities 
of the IARCs, with the exception of ISNAR, in Category 5 be limited to training and 
information because the Centers lack comparative advantage in institution building as 
such. It recommends that the Centers restrict their activities in capacity building of 
national programs to a strict minimum, with the obvious general exception of training. 
5.2. Duplication 
The Panel concluded that duplication on commodities, as might be said to 
have existed on maize, cassava, or rice in the past, is not a significant inefficiency. The 
appearance of duplication on themes--striga, cropping systems, soils, economics and 
public policy, to cite a few examples--occurs because the variability of common problems 
across the region makes it inevitable. The Panel found numerous collaborative 
mechanisms to avoid real duplication on such themes, concluded that this form of 
duplication was not a major cost to the system, and recommended no novel steps to 
eliminate this form of duplication. There probably was some duplication of training, but 
the Centers have recently begun to harmonize training activities. 
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5.3. The Ecoregional Approach and Alternative Organizations 
The Panel contends that the “decentralized network” alternative would be 
inefficient for three reasons because (i) it would not reduce information costs so as to 
impose accountability and scientific performance; (ii) it would create too much 
uncertainty about resource availability and accountability; and (iii) the suggested benefits 
of the decentralized network approach are already gained in the Centers or in related 
efforts, notably that of SPAAR. 
5.4. Governance 
Should center boards become political bodies? The Panel found occasional 
support for this among national programs, but not general support. 
Board size. Several interviews argued that consolidation of some Boards 
would be effective. The obvious regional example is IITA and WARDA, as those of 
ILCA and ILRAD have been merged. The Panel therefore recommends a common Board 
of Trustees for IITA and WARDA, with ex-officio representation of ICRISAT, ICRAF 
and IRRI (section 4.3.2) as a means of bettering the integration of research among those 
four Centers. 
Staff composition. Some NARS staff proposed that the IARCs should hire 
more regional scientists. The Panel strongly discourages any such policy because it might 
lead to political appointments and debase the quality of Center scientists. 
5.5. Relations with Partners 
National programs (section 4.51). The contacts with national programs are 
on the whole efficient. The Centers have many mechanisms to inform themselves about 
national activities, to receive input into their research planning, and to collaborate 
substantively on common problems. 
5.6. Center-Specific Recommendations 
This section lays out the analysis, recommendations and suggestions for 
external reviews of the leading Centers, excepting WARDA, which is discussed in 
Annex 1. 
5.6.1. IITA 
Maize improvement. The next external review of IITA should make a 
definitive recommendation about devolving humid forest maize research to one or several 
national programs. IITA has already considered this internally, so there is information for 
a prompt decision. 
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Interactions with tree crop research centers. Professor Carl Either has 
written that “IITA should develop scientific partnership with tree crop research centers in 
the NARS in West Africa” (Either, 1992, p. 30). The Panel has the admittedly superficial 
impression that IITA has already done so, but it is a point that the next external review 
can easily verify. 
5.6.2. ICRISAT 
The Niamey site. A grave problem in the institutional culture of ICRISAT 
was. always the domination of Hyderabad over West Africa. That domination forced the 
selection of the Niamey site and the insistence on research directions that should have 
been known to be fruitless (eg, the operational scale on-station trials that were 
mechanically copied from India to Africa). Much of the lack of production impact of 
ICRISAT in West Africa is due to the concentration at Niamey, which prevents effective 
work on sorghum and groundnut and relegates millet work to a fringe of the mandate 
area. Being in western Niger isolates millet improvement from such management issues as 
intercropping, mechanization, complex cropping patterns, and rotations because it works 
in a farming system which is quite unrepresentative of major systems in the West Africa 
SAT. Niamey is unlikely ever to be a regional center of academic excellence, in the way 
that Zaria would obviously have been. We are well aware that being at Niamey does not 
restrict operations to western Niger, but location determines much of what scientists do 
and Niamey is not a fully representative location”. 
ICRISAT has started to fix this error. It has built regional sorghum programs 
in Nigeria and Mali. It is moving groundnut staff to Bamako and Kano. It has sought to 
widen the prospective benefits of research at Niamey by building a training and 
information center and by broadening collaboration with ILCA on crop-livestock 
management, with ICRAF on agroforestry, and with IFDC and others on soils and land 
use. The Panel recommends that the ICRISAT research resource allocation model be 
continuously applied to the benefits and costs of the Center’s investment at Niamey with 
the specific objective of justifying it not only within ICRISAT, but across IARC and 
NARS partners in the region. The Panel recommends that ICRISAT sorghum work should 
be strengthened in Nigeria. It now consists of only a breeder, an entomologist and an 
agronomist and lacks capacities to do more basic work. The planned transfer of ICRISAT 
groundnut staff from Niamey to Kano should be strengthened by addition of new staff. 
Despite the decisive and correct steps taken by ICRISAT management to shift 
emphasis in West Africa, there remain two fundamental problems that do not appear to be 
adequately treated by ICRISAT; the first problem affects ILCA as well. 
18 ILRI, in commenting on this paragraph in the draft report, contended that the 
Panel’s remarks on the location of the ISC “will not improve the location of 
the CGIAR’s immovable investment at Sadore” and “that criticism of past 
decisions is not helpful”. The really important investments--staff--are of course 
movable and, in criticizing past decisions, we are trying to help the system 
avoid violating the second rule of medicine: if something isn’t working, stop 
doing it. 
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Crop and livestock management. There is still too much crop and livestock 
management and characterization research in the IARCs. That research (CGIAR category 
3) has little expectation of additional benefit because it often duplicates what farmers 
already know, what they can easily learn without research, what is a matter of extension, 
or what the national programs can do. The Panel is highly confident in its critique of this 
first problem and the report is definite about what to do about it (section 4.4.2). 
Crop improvement. We are less confident in our critique of the second 
problem. The breeding work of ICRISAT has not produced materials for general or even 
location-specific use in West Africa and so we begin from that fact, which ICRISAT, in a 
20 page reply to the draft report, did not really dispute. A millet breeder in the national 
program in Niger said that ICRISAT had made no progress since the late 1970s. 
Interviews with ICRISAT staff and national staff, reading on the subject and previous 
knowledge suggest that a more basic approach is needed. While we do not like to 
recommend additional reviews, we do not have the technical competence to say what to 
do about ICRISAT crop improvement work in West Africa. The Panel recommends a 
very high-level review of ICRISAT’s crop improvement programs in West Africa, 
including that of CIRAD for sorghum, one that brings independent biological scientists 
with no previous connection to ICRISAT staff, management, or Board. 
5.6.3. ILRI 
ILRI is, of course, uncertain about its mid-term program in Africa. It is 
hazardous to speculate about what it will do. Nonetheless, we get the profoundly 
depressing feeling that the CGIAR needs yet another rethinking of what it is trying to do 
with livestock research in West Africa. 
Effects of the new ILRI Mandate on CIRDES and ITC 
The expansion of ILRI’s mandate outside Africa, and the contraction of its 
resources from the sum of those of ILCA and ILRAD, means that ILRI will do less in 
West Africa than ILCA and ILRAD did. That fact and the completion of major ILCA and 
ILRAD work--the Malian Delta program, the trypanotolerance network, the subhumid 
zone studies in central Nigeria, various studies at ITC--implies greater responsibilities for 
national and regional efforts, including those of ITC and CIRDES. Growing roles for 
CIRDES and ITC without CGIAR funding are consistent with devolution and with a 
greater strategic element in the ILRI mandate, given that CIRDES and ITC work is 
applied. CIRDES and ITC do not have the financial base or scientific stature to join the 
system and the Panel does not recommend any CGIAR support to CIRDES or ITC, but 
they should be encouraged to compete for funds allocated by ILRI (ILRI, 1994, p. 25). 
ILRI Program 
The interactions of animals with crops, pastures, trees, and land and water 
resources impose a research organization in livestock distinct from that in crops. 
Scattering staff--l in Bobo-Dioulasso, 1 in Bamako, 2 in Kaduna, 2.5 in Ibadan, 3 in 
Niamey--has not produced and will not produce usable results. A small bilateral crops 
program (eg, ICRISAT in Mali in the 1980s) of a breeder and an agronomist can succeed 
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because it can distribute materials for testing. It can execute a large diverse program with 
low supervision costs per experiment, which is impossible with livestock studies. A small 
animal research team in an analogous fashion cannot succeed unless system 
characterization is all that is sought and that now can be done more cheaply by the 
national programs. 
Concentrating on animal production per se--genetics, especially--will not pay 
except in rare circumstances (eg, ranches or specialized dairy small holdings in the cool 
highlands) that are irrelevant for most African producers. The focus has to be on primary 
production for greater feed output. ILCA now has 2.5 staff (1 at Niamey, 1.5 at Ibadan, 
0 at Bobo-Dioulasso, 0 at Kaduna, 0 at Bamako) working on primary production. This is 
not enough. 
The ILRI presence at Bamako--one staff doing only liaison with national and 
regional programs--should be converted into a scientific post at Niamey or Ibadan because 
it is too expensive in isolation. Liaison offices of this type are only relevant for the 
germplasm Centers (the IRRI INGER coordinator at IITA is a good example) in which a 
lone scientist can have a full program managing the distribution, conduct, and analysis of 
trials. A strong indicator is that some national and regional programs visited by the Panel 
were unaware of the liaison office. 
The ILlU group of two scientists in central Nigeria is too small to be 
effective. It requires more staff to achieve critical mass, better physical facilities for 
program continuity, and close interactions with national or international crop scientists. 
There are at least three alternatives for that group. 
p Merge ILRI/Kaduna into NAPRI (National Animal Production Research 
Institute). NAPRI staff told the Panel that the chief barrier to an effective ILCA program 
had been discontinuity and argued that continuity could be achieved by basing ILRI staff 
at NAPRL The Panel rejected this suggestion on the grounds that, while continuity, 
critical mass and interactions with crop scientists are problems, an ILRI program in 
NAPRI would not have a specific international comparative advantage--it would not add 
anything different to what NAPRI does, as staff of the latter stated forcefully to the 
Panel. 
b Merge ILRI/Kaduna into the ICRISAT/IITA work near Kano, in order to 
benefit from interactions among the three. The Panel rejected this because the strong 
national program at Zaria--Ahmadu Bello University, IAR, and NAPRI--could provide 
staff, facilities and results that can interact with ILRI as ICRISAT and IITA would at 
Kano without moving the program, so that the logical alternative is to merge 
ILRI/Kaduna into NAPRI, which we have already rejected. 
b The Panel recommends that the ILRI/Kaduna positions be transferred to 
Ibadan to achieve critical mass, reduce administration costs, and facilitate study of 
crop-livestock-tree interactions with IITA and ICRAF. This will raise the ILRI principal 
staff number at Ibadan to 4.5 from 2.5 (2 animal scientists, 1.5 forage scientist, 1 
economist). Relations between IITA and ILRI have improved and administration costs 
have already been reduced in consequence. 
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5.6.4. IFPRI 
IFPRI has neglected Nigeria in favor of Burkina Faso, Niger, Senegal, and the 
Gambia. The Panel understands that the funding cycle has not lately permitted IFPRI to 
post staff in the region, though this may change as new special projects develop, 
including one in Ghana. However, even when IFPFU had 12 staff in West Africa, it had 
none in Nigeria. Moreover, its Washington staff have written little on Nigeria. Whatever 
may be the reasons for that past .neglect, the Panel recommends that IFPRI post 1 or 2 
permanent scientists at Kano or Ibadan, with the staff having the same links to the 
Nigerian universities that IITA and ICRISAT have. One of those scientists would be the 
regional coordinator of the social science work. 
IFPRI replied to the draft report that: i) it did not consider that policy 
research now had a positive expected impact in Nigeria; ii) it vigorously seeks 
possibilities for additional work on Nigeria; and iii) it has developed a joint research 
proposal with Nigerian institutions. IFPRI has further objected to the recommendation of 
putting staff with a regional coordination role in Nigeria, apart from doing research on 
that country from abroad, because of logistical difficulties and because qualified Nigerians 
can be brought to IFPRI, and to other external institutions. 
b IFPRI’s reply is admirably frank in stating that additional work on Nigeria 
is not justified in terms of expected net benefits. Nonetheless, we believe that political 
difficulties make it imperative to work on Nigeria because such difficulties often express 
themselves in bad policies. We are unsympathetic to the logistical difficulties argument 
because the other Centers manage to surmount it. While we accept that it is not essential 
that the regional coordination be based in Nigeria, our basic recommendations remain that 




Adesina, Akinwumi. Economics of Rice Production in West Africa. WARDA. 1994. 
Becker, Lawrence and Roger Diallo. Characterization and Classification of Rice 
Agroecosystems in Cote d’Ivoire. WARDA. 1992. 
Boserup, Esther. Conditions of agricultural growth. Allen and Unwin. 1965. 
CGIAR Secretariat. The CGIAR in the 21st Century: Options for Structural Change. 
CGIAR. 1994a. 
CGIAR Secretariat. Current CGIAR Research Efforts and their Expected Impact on 
Food, Agriculture and Natrional Development. CGIAR. 1994b. 
CIMMYT. 1992/93 World Wheat Facts and Trends. CIMMYT. 1993. 
Crosson, Pierre and Jock R. Anderson. Achieving a sustainable Agricultural System in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. World Bank. 1994. 
Dumont, Rene. Types of Rural Economy: Studies in World Agriculture. Metheun and 
Co, Ltd. 1957. 
Ehui, Simeon and Dunstan S. C. Spencer. Measuring the Sustainability and Economic 
Viability of Tropical Farming Systems: A Model from sub-Saharan Africa.‘ Agricultural 
Economics. 9:279-296. 1993. 
Gilbert, Elon, Peter J. Matlon, and P. Eyzaguirre. New Perspectives for Vulnerable 
Institutions: Agricultural Research Systems in the Small Countries of West Africa. 
ISNAR. 1992. 
Gisselquist, David. Privatizing technological change in agriculture. World Bank. 1992. 
Harkness, C., A. A. Awale and S. Gillett. Cowpea Extension and Research in Kano 
State, Nigeria, 1982-1984. KNARDA. n.d. 
Hassan, Boubacar. Evaluation sur le terrain de l’adoption des banques fourrageres 
par les agropastoralistes dans le nord du Nigeria. PhD dissertation. Utah State 
University. 1993. 
ICRAF. Agroforestry for Improved Land Use: ICRAF’s Medium-Term Plan 1994-98. 
ICRAF. 1993. 
ICRISAT. ICRISAT’s research and agricultural transformation in Africa. Symposium 
on Impact of Technology on Agricultural Transformation in Africa, Washington, DC. 
1992a. 
ICRISAT. Medium Term Plan 1994-98: Volume 2 Financial Tables. ICRISAT. 1992b. 
57 
IITA. Grain Legume Improvement Program. Part I. Cowpea Breeding Archival 
Report (1988-1992). ETA. 1993. 
ILRI. An Indicative Medium-Term Plan for the International Livestock Research 
Institute. Manuscript. 1994. 
Jahnke, Hans E, Dieter Kirschke and Johannes Lagemann. The Impact of Agricultural 
Research in Tropical Africa: A Study of the Collaboration between the International 
and National Research Systems. CGIAR Study Paper No. 21. 1985. 
Manyong, M., J. Smith, G. Weber, S.S. Jagtap, and B. Oyewole. 
Macro-Characterization of agricultural systems in West Africa: A Broad Overview. 
IITA. 1994. 
Matlon, Peter J. A Critical Review of Objectives, Methods, and Progress to Date in 
Sorghum and Millet Improvement: A Case Study of Burkina Faso. in H. W. Ohm and J. 
G. Nagy (eds) Appropriate Technologies for Farmers in Semiarid West Africa, pp. 
165-178. Purdue University. 1985. 
Mazzucato, Valentina. Statistical Brief on the National Agricultural Research System 
of Mali. ISNAR. 1994b. 
Mazzucato, Valentina. Statistical Brief on the National Agricultural Research System 
of Burkina Faso. ISNAR. 1994a. 
Mazzucato, Valentina and Mohamadou El-Habib Ly. Statistical Brief on the National 
Agricultural Research System of Senegal. ISNAR. 1994. 
Mazzucato, Valentina and Samba Ly. Statistical Brief on the National Agricultural 
Research System of Niger. ISNAR. 1993. 
McIntire, John. The Economics of Malian Rice Policy. PhD dissertation. Tufts 
University. 1980. 
McIntire, John, Daniel Bourzat and Prabhu Pingali. Crop-Livestock Interaction in 
sub-Saharan Africa. World Bank. 1992. 
Neuenschwander, Peter and W. N. 0. Hammond. Impact assessment of the biological 
control of the cassava mealybug. Bulletin entomological research. 79: 579-594. 1989. 
Norgaard, Richard B. The Biological Control of Cassava Mealybug in Africa. 
American Journal of Agricultural Economics. 70, No. 2: 366-371. 
Oehmke, James F. and Eric W. Crawford. The Impact of Agricultural Technology in 
Sub-Saharan Africa: A Synthesis of Symposium Findings. Michigan State University, 
Dept of Agricultural Economics. 1993. 
Pardey, Philip G. and Roseboom, Johannes. ISNAR Agricultural Research Indicator 
Series: A Global Data Base on National Agricultural Research Systems. ISNAR. 1989. 
58 
Pingali, Prabhu, Yves Bigot and Hans P. Binswanger. Agricultural mechanization and 
the Evolution of Farming Systems Research in Sub-Saharan Africa. World Bank. 
1987. 
Roseboom, Johannes and Philip G. Pardey. Statistical Brief on the National 
Agricultural Research System of Cote d’Ivoire. ISNAR. 1994a. 
Roseboom, Johannes and Philip G. Pardey. Statistical Brief on the National 
Agricultural Research System of Ghana. ISNAR. 1994b. 
Roseboom, Johannes, Nienke M. Bientema, Philip G. Pardey and E. 0. Oyedipe. 
Statistical Brief on the National Agricultural Research System of Nigeria. ISNAR. 
1994. 
Ruthenberg, Hans. Farming Systems in the Tropics. Oxford University Press, 3rd edn. 
1980. 
Silla, I. S., F. N. Dahniya, M. T. Dahniya and A. Jalloh. Evaluation of cassava 
gentoypes for processing into gari. Tropical Root and Tuber Crops Bulletin. 7: 1. 1993 
Tabor, Stephen. Structural Adjustment and Agricultural Research. ISNAR. 
Forthcoming, 1995. 
TAC Secretariat. Report of the First External Program and Management Review of 
IIMI. TAC Secretariat. 1994. 
Traxler, Gregory and Derek Byerlee. Economic Returns to Crop Management Research 
in a Post-green Revolution Setting. American Journal of Agricultural Economics. 
741573-82. 
USAID. Recommendations and Follow-up actions-- Workshop on Regionalization of 
Research in West and Central Africa. USAID. 1994. 
WARDA. The WARDA Model: Open Center and Task Force Approach to 
Collaboration. WARDA. undated. 
Weijenberg, Jan, ‘Josue Dione, Michael Fuchs-Carsch, Adolphe Kere, and Jaques Lefort. 
Revitalizing agricultural research in the Sahel: A Proposed Framework for Action. 
World Bank Discussion Papers, Africa Technical Department Series No. 211. 1993. 
World Bank. Senegal - Second Agricultural Research Project Staff appraisal report 
(Report 7675-SE). World Bank. 1990. 
Zinnah, Moses M., J. Lin Compton, and Akinwumi A. Adesina. 
Research-Extension-Farmer Linkages within the Context of the Generation, Transfer and 
Adoption of Improved Mangrove Swamp Rice Technology in West Africa. Quarterly 
Journal of International Agriculture. 32: 2, p. 201-213. 1993. 
ANNEX 1 
HOW APPLICABLE IS THE WARDA MODEL TO THE OTHER CENTERS? 
WARDA is distinct from the other IARCs in West Africa. It (i) is an 
intergovernmental organization subject to regional governance; (ii) has a supracongruent 
allocation (Inter-Center Rice Review); (iii) nurtures unusually close relations with the NARS 
and has announced the intention to become an “Open Center”; and (iv) has defined its 
program with respect to the evolution of land use and farming systems. 
WARDA has presented an Open Center Model which may be more broadly 
applicable in West Africa. Its features would be: 
1. An ecoregional mandate that refers explicitly to cropping systems (WARDA 
undated, p. 2). 
2. A limited regional mandate, relinquishing extra-African responsibilities to other 
centers (eg, the WARDA/IRRI relation). 
3. A Task Force approach in which the scientific agenda is driven by regional 
research needs (WARDA undated, p. 3), a more equal partnership with the NARS fosters “a 
stronger sense of ownership” of programs by the latter, and task sharing is based on 
comparative advantage, planned and implemented through thematic groups (the Task 
Forces). 
4. An Open Center model, defined by WARDA as “a permanent institutional 
framework within which to attract, focus and facilitate the efforts of a range of collaborators 
working together in partnership. ” The Open Center provides critical mass in research 
“through a combination of a small core group of WARDA scientists conducting research 
over a range of key disciplines to provide continuity and partners from other institutions . . . ” 
Another aspect of the model is allowing national and other collaborators to use Center 
facilities. An example is work on “The Sustainable Use of Inland Valley Agrosystems in 
Sub-Saharan Africa” (WARDA undated, p. 5). 
5. Greater regional representation on the Board, and in the staff, management, 
problem definition, and resource allocation. 
There is much to recommend in this model. It defines the ecoregional approach in an 
operational manner. It anticipates the rising environmental costs of intensification. It 
recognizes the interactions that necessitate a cropping systems focus. The national programs 
support it; they praise the Task Forces over similar arrangements in the other Centers for 
promoting an efficient exchange of information about researchable problems among 
WARDA and national scientists and for sharing responsibilities and money more equitably. 
How do the activities of other West African Centers differ from those of WARDA? 
Ecoregional mandate. Allowing for minor differences in terminology, ICRISAT, 
ICRAF and IITA have ecoregional mandates covering the same breadth of problems that 
WARDA’s has. ILCA’s mandate has been interpreted to permit studies of crop-livestock 
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(and sometimes tree) systems in the principal climates of Sub-Saharan Africa. IITA and 
ICRAF have interactions with institutions working on non-Center crops (e.g., tree crops). 
The Panel found no material differences in the mandates or programs of IITA, ICRISAT, 
ILCA, and ICRAF that would justify any change to approximate the WARDA model in 
terms of proximity to the ecoregional notion. 
No extra-regional responsibilities. IITA has abandoned extra-regional 
responsibilities for maize, sweet potato, and for cassava outside Africa. Professor Carl 
Either has recommended (Either 1992, p, 29) that IITA abandon East Africa, in favor of 
West and Central Africa, but this is undesirable given the common crops, smallholder 
production systems, and environmental questions in the three subregions. 
The Task Force approach. The main elements are: (i) response to regional needs as 
expressed by the national programs; (ii) task sharing based on a collaborative common 
definition of comparative advantage; (iii) a greater allocation of responsibility to the NARS 
member of the partnership than is said to occur in other Centers; and (iv) joint decisions 
about funding. With the exception of joint decisions about funding, the Panel did not find 
this approach to differ materially from the practices of the other major centers. (Section 4 of 
the main report discusses center consultations with national programs at some length). It 
concludes that--with due attention to the costs of consultation and to the costs of a more 
explicit political approach to decision-making--the Centers now consult justifiably and 
efficiently with national program partners. 
The Panel accepts that “joint decisions about funding” can be an efficient innovation 
because it allocates resources based on comparative advantage, reduces duplication, fills 
gaps, and promotes accountability. Nonetheless, the Panel cannot conclude that “joint 
decisions about funding” is so novel or applicable that it merits general application as a new 
operating rule. First, it is not new because funding decisions about training are already 
intrinsically joint given that trainees funded by Centers are invariably nominated by their 
NARS. Second, it is not new because the Centers already manage funds jointly with national 
partners in an extensive set of collaborative research projects. Third, it is not generally 
applicable without perilous changes in the Centers’ independence given that sizable fixed 
investment decisions (e.g., buildings) are difficult to make jointly on scientific grounds alone 
and so political criteria are inevitably applied. One imagines with some difficulty the Centers 
making site location decisions largely on political grounds, the way the CILSS members do, 
to give one pertinent illustration. Fourth, it is not generally applicable to staffing, always the 
greatest fraction of research cost. Recruitment, evaluation, and promotion decisions are 
inherently most efficient within a single institution because of the costs of acquiring the 
long-term knowledge needed to manage staff. (Minimization of such costs is of course one 
of the reasons that large institutions emerge as economically efficient entities.) 
The Panel concludes that the benefits of joint decisions about funding can be 
harvested with flexible and practical procedures developed through collaboration among 
partners, not by the imposition of rigid rules. Joint decisions about funding will become less 
relevant in research agencies, and more the preserve of donors, as the national programs 
become more able to compete for common funds. However, as long as the national 
programs depend on the Centers, or on others like them, for access to donors, then joint 
decisions about funding are a feasible institution to weaken the unwarranted grip of the 
stronger partners over the money. 
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The Open Center Model. The Open Center model does not differ significantly from 
what ICFUSAT does at Niamey, or from what IITA does at Ibadan. They: (i) are permanent; 
(ii) attract staff from different collaborators, including other IARCs, regional and foreign 
universities and networks; (iii) support NARS work, notably degree students from African 
universities; (iv) operate in several key disciplines to achieve critical mass without 
necessarily having all the disciplines based in the convening center’. There are many more 
disciplines at Niamey and Ibadan than at Bouake because of the larger programs at the 
former.; and (v) are continuous because they are permanent. It is premature to speculate 
about the evolution about the IITA/ICRAF activities in the Cameroon or about the 
ICRISAT/CIRAD/ICRAF programs in Bamako. In both instances, there is the danger that 
the Centers will become isolated from. national and other partners, a fear that was strongly 
expressed by Malian national program staff, but one lesson of WARDA’s current structure 
is that it is possible to have very good relations with the NARS while maintaining 
independence. 
The Open Center Model and WARDA’s future. There has been speculation that 
becoming an Open Center is WARDA’s path to expansion through diversification out of 
rice. This move would be consistent with WARDA’s character as a regional research pole, 
and with the ecoregional approach. If WARDA seeks to expand beyond the special 
justification for rice in West Africa, then it is hard to see how it differs from being an 
outstation of IITA and the question of consolidating the two should be raised again. 
Governance. WARDA establishes a precedent for other regional centers (eg, 
CIRDES, ITC) in the limited sense of having a partly political character, not in the sense of 
eventual entry into the CGIAR. WARDA and IITA are appropriate precedents for the 
evolution of ICRISAT as an African Center in mandate, but not in governance since the 
risks of political interference with staffing, priorities, operations, and funding of regional 
institutions are too great. 
Costs. WARDA seems, on the basis of information presented in the Desk Study, to 
have lower relative administration costs than IITA and ICRISAT which are the most directly 
comparable Centers in West Africa. The contrast between ICRISAT and WARDA, both 
CFA countries, certainly bears investigating. It is possible that the Open Center model has 
hidden costs of administration--for example, multiple reports for multiple donors--among 
partners at a site that need to be considered by external reviews. 
How WARDA should be evaluated. WARDA should be evaluated on results, not on 
the good feelings engendered by its excellent collaboration with national programs. 
Collaboration is admirable but it is not field results, only ‘a (possible) way of achieving 
them. Results must always be the basic point in any decisions about WARDA’s 
effectiveness. 
’ There are many more disciplines at Niamey and Ibadan than at Bouake because of 
the larger programs at the former. 
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CREATING A LONG-TERM PERSPECTIVE 
The Centers are under pressure to get quick results because it is sometimes held 
that quick results are feasible through adaptive research without basic or strategic 
research. Behind the notion that adaptive research can pay quickly are the erroneous 
presumptions that external technologies can be directly productive in Africa and that no 
research has been done in Africa. Pressure for quick results distorts the priorities of the 
IARCs away from their evolving comparative advantage and forces them into competition 
with the NARS precisely where the latter have begun to assert themselves. 
The only way to resist this pressure, and to avoid the hazards it poses to the 
integrity of the IARCs, is to develop a long-term perspective in the IARCs and sell it to 
the donors, regional governments, NGOs and others. What does this mean? 
b Estimating the benefits of strategic and basic research to counter the 
dangerously misguided clamor for quick results at the expense of deeper scientific 
understanding. The Panel saw no evidence that such estimates are being made. One 
prominent instance is the interesting projections of the future economic benefits needed to 
pay for ILRAD. The tart exchange of opinions concerning the relevance of those 
projections obscured the fact that ILRAD--and those other Centers confronting the same 
critique--have not replied quantitatively or even in the same economic terms. 
b Identifying the scientific impact of research, whether it has field impact or not. 
The Panel’s reading of Center efforts to measure impact is that they consist largely of the 
standard adoption studies with inadequate attention to scientific impact. While field impact 
is obviously the most relevant indicator, and while the standard studies are meritorious, 
scientific impact has also to be measured to gauge the intellectual and intermediate effects 
of research. The Panel saw no evidence that this is being done systematically, although 
IITA staff have begun some steps in this direction. 
b Stopping some enterprises that exist at least partly because money is, or might 
be, on offer. A limited set of examples might include: 
b b The IITA Cameroon bilateral project, which was closed in 1992. 
b b The Desert Margins Initiative. It is hard to see how further emphasis on arid, 
low potential areas can be justified when current efforts in those areas have had a low 
payoff. The poverty argument for this additional emphasis is not strong given the low 
populations in arid West Africa. 
b b Some of IFPRI’s West Africa program, which needs to be reoriented towards 
the larger countries. 
b b All of IIMI’s West Africa program, in which the Center executes special 
projects in Burkina Faso, Niger, and Nigeria with somewhat imprecise links to national 
or international research. 
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b b That part of ISNAR’s work which consists of consulting for the World Bank. 
While we praised ISNAR’s work with national programs, and while national scientists 
interviewed by the Panel appreciated ISNAR’s efforts, the latter want a long-term 
intellectual direction. Those who disagree must answer the question: what will ISNAR do 
in West Africa when the initial round of Bank-funded agricultural research projects is 
completed? 
With the exception of the Desert Margins initiative, which is in a major Center, 
the short-term initiatives we have criticized are in Centers with marginal weight in West 
Africa. This is not an accident. ISNAR, IFPRI, and IIMI have global, flexible and largely 
non-technical mandates that lend themselves to greater freedom and creativity in their 
implementation because they are not rooted in one ecoregion or group of commodities. 
When funds are scarce, greater freedom has in some instances led to initiatives without a 
broader purpose. The Panel sees this criticism as being in the terms of reference of the 
external reviews, and the point was indeed made by the recent IIMI review, but the 
problem has resurfaced on so many occasions that one wonders how seriously the Centers 
take the criticism. 
b Developing a consensus to distinguish between true natural science research 
problems and problems caused by bad policies which require little or no natural science 
research for their solution. Irrigation research is the prime example. Removing the costs 
of weak property rights and cheap water pricing on irrigation efficiency would often 
provoke such a supply response with existing technologies that additional natural science 
research is unnecessary or can be cheaply invented by the farmers themselves. A second 
and more general example is that the Centers seem unaware of the Crosson-Anderson 
distinction of productivity gains from higher yields on undegraded lands and gains from 
restoration of degraded lands. Restoration gains can sometimes be had by improving 
property rights or bettering input pricing policies without natural science investigations. 
The Panel observed that the historical antipathy between natural and social scientists is as 




TAC commented that the draft report “raised significant issues which go beyond 
the sub-region”. It asked that a section of the final report be devoted to “analysis of 
general systemwide issues to provide a clear basis for the associated recommendations”. 
We believe that the main text of the final report justifies the recommendations on the 
systemwide issues in West Africa. In this annex, we summarize the chief systemwide 
issues and indicate what further analysis or actions the system might consider beyond 
West Africa. This is not a comprehensive treatment. 
The main systemic issues raised by the report are: i) CGIAR relations with small 
NARS and the institutional implications of the particular characteristics and needs of 
small countries; ii) CGIAR efforts in marginal rainfed areas; iii) the future of production 
systems and management research (Category 3); iv) the future of institution-building 
efforts (Category 5) by the Centers other than ISNAR; and v) studies of CGIAR 
Commitments in other Regions. The first four share the aspect of reflecting the intense 
pressure on the Centers to do everything, everywhere, for everybody. 
Relations with small NARS. We argue that a significant Center presence (defined 
not entirely arbitrarily to include a breeder, a pathologist, an entomologist, an 
agronomist, and an economist) in a small countryA’ is too great a commitment relative to 
the expected benefits of research. A group of five staff would exceed the entire presence 
of most of the Centers in West Africa today. This argument depends on the justifiable 
assumptions that most, if not all, of the team’s work is devoted to the host country, with 
few spillovers to other situations; and that the weakness of the host country’s research and 
extension services causes the Center presence to substitute for what the national system 
would ordinarily do. We further argue that the basic need of the small country is 
academically trained people, without which physical and institutional investments are 
wasted. We note, moreover, that there are many sources of technical assistance and 
knowledge transfer available to small and large developing countries alike that did not 
exist even 20 years ago. 
This chain of reasoning leads to the conclusions that: i) the Centers should avoid 
long-term and large physical presence of staff in small countries; ii) other interactions- 
germplasm exchanges, joint trials, training, professional meetings, study tours--are 
obviously vital; iii) Center research has to be designed to produce spillovers with these 
countries in mind, as ICRISAT is specifically attempting to do; iv) the role of ISNAR can 
be crucial in the initial phase of institutional development, but it has to be recognized that 
other institutions--universities, private firms, the development banks, regional 
organizations and SPAAR--can offer the same services in many instances; and v) Center 
boards, Center management, and the external reviews have to be careful about the level 
of commitments to small countries, most importantly where the Centers involved are not 
L’ In West Africa, they are Mauritania, the Gambia, Guinea Bissau, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Togo, Benin, and Chad. 
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crop germplasm centers (e.g. ICLARM, ISNAR, IFPRI, ILRI, ICRAF, CIFOR) because 
of the higher fixed costs of research outside the crop area. 
CGIAR Commitments in Marginal Rainfed Areas. The impact of agricultural 
research in marginal rainfed areas has been weak. This is most noticeable in Africa. We 
take the Centers’ argument that some of the absence of impact is the fault of weak 
national research, extension and input supply systems. Even so, the basic return is certain 
to be lower in these zones even when they have better support services compared to zones 
of cheap irrigation, deeper soils, and less variable climate. The lower expected and 
realized return should accordingly elicit lower CGIAR investment, even when poverty and 
environmental benefits are considered. Yet system documents and what might be called 
the public debate often permit the inference that the marginal lands are the principal target 
of the Centers’ labors. 
The Panel found that Center production impact in the marginal areas of West 
Africa was basically ml, so far. This observation applies mainly to ICRISAT (millet and 
sorghum) and ILCA (livestock), and partly to IITA (cowpea and maize) and WARDA 
(rice). To improve overall impact--i.e., the sum of marginal and better areas--we have 
recommended a shift in emphasis toward category 2 research away from category 3 
within the IARCs; shift of category 3 research to the national programs; a deeper 
scientific re-examination of the objectives, methods, constraints, and results of ICRISAT 
crop improvement work in the dry areas; and a shift toward the wetter areas by both 
ICRISAT and ILRI. 
Though the issues affect most Centers they do not seem to have been fully 
analyzed yet, despite the good prospect in the Marginal Lands Initiative led by IFPRI. 
What is missing is consideration of the other forces driving the growth of human welfare 
in the marginal areas. Those include growth in the better agricultural areas, which pulls 
people out of the marginal areas; growth outside agriculture which has the same effect, 
and the genesis of property rights and other institutions that lift the return on private 
investment in marginal lands. The Stripe Review on Public Policy ought specifically to 
consider these issues because they should determine resource allocations to biological 
research. 
Production Systems and Management Research. We have argued that the 
growth of the NARS capacity--if not their research output--and the general lack of impact 
of production systems research z’ justify a deemphasis of Category 3 research in the 
Centers, and a reorientation of the remaining Category 3 work toward strategic problems. 
Despite the unhappy reactions from several quarters, we suspect that these. 
recommendations will eventually be implemented, though grudgingly. We further suspect 
that the greater capacity of the national programs elsewhere will make these 
recommendations apply a fortiori outside West Africa. A more thorough, aggressive, and 
critical review of the objectives, methods, and results of category 3 research should be a 
2’ To make this point again, ICRISAT reports expected impacts on 11 Category 2 problems (CGIAR 1994b)-millet 
stem borer in Africa, pearl millet downy mildew, chickpea ascochyta blight, wilt resistance in pigeonpea, 
groundnut rosette resistance, midge resistance in sorghum, drought resistance in groundnut, drought resistance 
in chickpea, cold tolerance in sorghum, cold tolerance in chickpea, and pigeonpea hybrids. It reports 1 expected 
impact in Category 3--windbreaks for soil erosion--and it is not entirely certain that this is a research problem. 
The paper of Crosson and Anderson (1994) supports this point as well. 
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permanent feature of each external review; it is easy to be beguiled by the Center’s less- 
than-disinterested reactions and to forget the general lack of impact of this field. 
Institution Building (Category 5). We are aware of the vocal interest that asserts 
the Centers should do more in this area. This interest should be resisted because: i) much 
of this category is outside the mandate of the Centers, with the specific exception of 
ISNAR’s; ii) there are obstacles to good institutions that the Centers cannot budge; iii) 
basic Center activities (e. g . multilocational trials) have positive institutional spillovers 
through knowledge transfer; and iv) there are many adequate competing sources of supply 
for the products of this Category. Category 5--including training--should be de- 
emphasized for those reasons and the savings shifted into Category 2. The system, 
notably through the “Inter-Center Training Program for sub-Saharan Africa”, is reacting 
appropriately in Africa, though we do not know about the other regions. The subject of 
competing suppliers should be considered systemwide in the next external review of 
ISNAR. 
CGIAR Commitments in other Regions. This study could be usefully done 
elsewhere, but more cost-effectively. It should be done jointly with the external review of 
the principal Center of the region (e.g. ICARDA for WANA or IRRI for East Asia) by a 
member of the Center review; the designated member would not be additional to the 
Panel, but would replace another normal member. This would allow the person doing the 
commitments study to be supported by the TAC Secretariat and to interact with the 
members of the external review at no additional cost. The external review of the major 
Center would be preceded by a meeting of NARS leaders, like the one held at Bouake, 
and, if convenient, by a TAG meeting at the same time to introduce the study and to have 
the benefits of the meeting of NARS leaders at one time. 
ANNEX 4 
TERMS OF REFERENCE 
A. Terms of Reference 
The Terms of Reference were: 
1 * To make an inventory of, and assess CGIAR facilities, personnel, 
programs, and activities, program expenditure and level of capital 
investment in the West Africa region. 
2. To identify and propose (a) cost-effective options for organizing and 
operating the future CGIAR presence in the region; and (b) whether the 
Study should be expanded to other regions, based on the assessment of the 
usefulness of the West Africa Study to the System. 
B. List of Specific Issues to be Addressed by the Panel 
It was expected that the Study would also deal with the following specific issues: 
1. Evaluation of Centers’ outputs and methods of impact assessment; 
2. Synthesis of NARS views on, and capacity to use, CGIAR delivery 
mechanisms; 
3. Identification of overlaps and gaps in current CGIAR delivery mechanisms 
and means of amelioration; 
4. Strategies/options to increase efficiency and effectiveness of CGIAR 
delivery mechanisms. 
ANNEX 5 
LIST OF INSTITUTIONS VISITED AND PERSONS MET 
1. MALI (4-6 August 1994) 
WASIP/CIRAD, Samanko 
Dr. S.N. Lohani, Principal Millet Breeder 
Dr. A. Ratnadass, Principal Entomologist 
Dr. J. Gigou, Agronomist 
Mr. Dramane Doumiba, Administrative Officer 
Mr. I. Sissoko, Senior Research Assistant 
Mr. D. Sanogo, Senior Research Assistant 
INS AH 
Dr. Josue Diane, Economist, Food Security Research 
Dr. Laomaibao Netoyo, Ag . Economist, Drought Resistance, Network Coordinator 
Dr. DaoulC Diallo Ba, Phytopathologist, IPM Research 
Hamadi Dirko, Secretaire Permanent CNRA/IER 
Bino Teme, Chef DRSPR 
Aboubacar Toure, Chef Programme Sorgho 
Amadou B. CissC, CRRA/Nioro 
Mamadou Ouattara, CRRA/Mopti 
Aly Kouriba, D/CRRA Kayes 
Meme Togola, Chef DRZ/IER 
Souleymane Camara, Representant Chef DRFH 
Youssouf Manian Diarra, DPAER 
Ousmane Moriba Sanogo, Cond/DPAER 
Boubacar Traore, P/D/CRRA, Sikasso 
NTji Coulibaly, Chef Programme Mais 
Amadou Diarra, Chef DRA/IER 
Yacouba Ousmane Doumbia, Directeur du CRRALSOTUBA 
2. BURKINA FASO (7-9 August 1994) 
CIRDES, Bobo Dioulasso and Banankeledapa 
Dr. G. Duvallet, Chief of Epidemiology Programme 
Dr. B. Bauer, Chief of Entomology Programme 
Dr. Babine Kanwe, Research Scientist 
Dr. Lassina Ouattara, Research Scientist 
Dr. Augustin Bassingo, Research Scientist 
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Ing. Diara Thiombiano, Research Scientist (Agronomist) 
Dr. Adamo Ouedraogo, Veterinarian 
INERA, Kamboinse 
Dr. G. Roger Zambre, Selectionneur Chef du CRAF 
Dr. Francois Lompo, Agro-pedologue, Chef Programme ESFINA 
Dr. Ouedraogo S., Agroeconomist, Chef Programme RSP 
Dr. Guira Moussa, Agronome Arboriculteur CMFPT 
Dr. Clementine Dabire, Chef de Prog. Proteagineux 
Dr. Gilles Trouche, CIRAD Deligue p.i. 
Dr. Amidou Tamboura, Programme, Productions Animales 
Dr. Drissa Konate, Programme SOMIMA Virologiste 
Dr. Pace Sereme, Phytopathologist, SOMIMA 
INERA, Ouagadougou 
Dr. P.C. BClem, Director, INERA 
NIGER (9-15 August 1994) 
ISC, Niamev/Sadore 
Dr. K. Harmsen, Executive Director 
Dr. J.C. W. Odongo, Principal Scientist (ICRAF), Agronomy 
Dr. A. Bationo, Principal Scientist, Soil Chemistry (IFDC) 
Dr. J.H. Williams, Principal Scientist, Physiology 
Dr. W. Payne, Principal Millet Physiologist 
Ms. R.H. Gottfried, Regional Information Officer and Training Coordinator 
Mr. Bruno Gerard, Farm Manager/GIS Expert 
ILCA, Niamev (ISC Sadore) 
Dr. T.O. Williams, Economist 
Dr. S. Femandez, Animal Scientist 
Dr. M. Turner, Geographer 
INRAN. Niamev 
Mr. Toukoura, Interim Director General 
Mr. Gauta, Interim Deputy Director General 
UNDP. Niamev 
Dr. M. Ouattara, ICRISAT Board Member and former INRAN Director General 
INRAN. Kolo Research Station 
Dr. Haougui Adamou, Plant Pathologist 
Dr. Mohamane Moussa 
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Dr. Seyni Sirifi 
Dr. Naino Jika, Chef de Station, Responsable du Departement de Recherches 
Agricoles (DRA) 
Dr. Maiga Seyni, Entomologiste 
Dr. Abdourahamane Alou, Agronome/Riz 
4. NIGjERIA (1523 August 1994) 
IITA/ICRISAT/IAR. Kano 
Dr. B.B. Singh, IITA Team Leader, Breeder 
Dr. 0. Ajayi, Principal Scientist (Entomology) and ICRISAT Team Leader 
Dr. R. Tabo, Principal Scientist (ISC), Agronomy 
Mr. W.C. Mayaki, i/c IAR Station 
Alh. M. Abba, KNARDA Project, Director, Agricultural Services 
Mr. I.D. Musa, Deputy Director, MANR 
Dr. S.F. Blade, Agronomist/Breeder - IITA (Post Dot.) 
Dr. H. Bottenberg, IITA 
Mr. C.I. Amafobi, Entomologist, IAR 
Mr. T . Terao , Physiologist, IITA/JIRCAS 
Dr. E.C. Odion, Agronomist, IAR/ABU 
Mr. M. Badawi, Deputy Director, Adaptive Research 
IAR, Ahmadu Bello Universitv (ABU), Zaria 
Prof. Olugbeni, Director 
Prof. L.B. Kaul, Agric. Mechanization 
Prof. 1.0. Erinle, Horticultural Crops 
Prof. Olukosi, Farming Systems 
Prof. A.M. Emechebe, Agronomy, and Deputy Director (Research) 
Dr. E.N.O. Iwuafor 
Dr. 0.0. Olufaji, Legumes and Oilseeds 
Dr. A.A. Ramalam, Irrigation Research 
Dr. L.A. Ega, Deputy Director (Extension) 
Dr. A.O. Ogungbile, Farming Systems 
Dr. T.K. Atala, Extension Services 
Dr. C. Harkness, Visiting Scientist, Plant Breeder 
Dr. V.B. Ogunlela, Fibres 
Dr. A.D. Akpa, Crop Protection 
Dr. J.D. Olarewaju, Food Science & Technology 
NAPRI. ABU, Zaria 
Prof. E.O. Oyedipe, Director 
Dr. M.S. Kallah, Deputy Director 
Dr. L.O. Eduru, Assistant Director 
Dr. 0. A. Osinowo, Extension Research 
Dr. C.A.M. Lakpini, Small Ruminants 
Dr. M.E. Abdumalik, Rabbit Research 
Dr. 0. S. Onipade, Forage and Crop Residues 
Dr. B.Y. Abubakar, Poultry Research 
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Dr. A.M. Adamu, Beef Research 
Dr. 0. W. Ehoche, Dairy Research 
Dr. E.O. Otchere, Livestock Systems 
IAR&T, Moor Plantation, Ibadan 
Prof. A.M. Daramola, Deputy Director Agronomy 
Prof. J.O. Ojo-Atere, Pedology 
Dr. E.A. Adebowale, Animal Nutrition 
Dr.S.A. Shoyinka, Plant Pathology 
Dr. P. 0. Oyekan, Plant Pathology 
Dr. (Mrs.) 0. Omueti, Biochemistry 
Dr. V.A. Banjoko, Soil Chemistry 
Dr. (Mrs.) Y.O.K. Osikanlu, Plant Pathology 
Dr. T.A. Fadare, Entomology 
Dr. J.E. Iken, Plant Breeding 
Mrs. B. Ikhizama, Library 
Mr. Amusan, Statistics 
IITA/ILCA/IRRI, Ibadan 
Dr. L. Brader, Director General, IITA 
Dr. J.P. Eckebil, Deputy Director General, International Cooperation 
Mr. W. Powell, Deputy Director General, Management 
Dr. S .A. Adetunji, Special Assistant to Director General 
Dr. F.M. Quinn, Director, Crop Improvement 
Dr. J.O. Akobundu, Weed Science 
Dr. R. Carsky, Systems Agronomy, Moist Savanna 
Dr. N. Sanginga, Soil Microbiology 
Dr. Y. Hayashi, Agronomy 
Dr. A.M. Manyong, Agric. Economics (Post Dot.) 
Dr. M. Gichuru, Soil Fertility 
Dr. F.I. Nweke, Agric. Economics 
Dr. A. P. Uriyo , International Cooperation 
Dr. K. Alluri, IRRI Liaison Scientist, INGER./Africa 
Dr. J. Smith, Animal Scientist and Programme Leader, ILCA 
Dr. J . Gullay , International Cooperation 
Dr. P.B. Thenkabail, Remote Sensing Specialist 
Dr. G. Tian, Agronomist (Post Dot.) 
Dr. Y. W: Jeon, Post Harvest Technologist 
Dr. J. Tonye, Assistant Coordinator, AFNETA 
Dr. K. Dashiell, Leader, GLIP/Soybean Breeder 
Dr. C. Fatokun, Plant Breeder, Cowpea 
Dr. A. Dixon, Plant Breeder, Cassava 
Dr. I. N . Kasale, Agronomist/Crop Physiologist (Post Dot . ) 
Dr. N. Wanyera, Plant Breeder, Yam (Post Dot.) 
Dr. R. Asiedu, Leader TRIP/Cassava, Yam Breeder 
Dr. I. Ingelbrecht, Molecular Biology, Cowpea 
Annex 5 - Page 5 
5. BENIN (22-23 August 1994) 
IITA. Cotonou. Plant Health Management Proaramme 
Dr. P. Neuenschwander, Programme Leader 
Mr. J. Quaye, Administrator 
INRAB. Cotonou 
Mr. G. Agbahungba, Director, Agricultural Research 
CBRST. Cotonou 
Mr. A. Nestor, Director General 
6. CAMEROON (24-26 August 1994) 
IITA, Yaounde 
Dr. S. Weise, Team Leader, Weed/Vegetation Management 
Dr. M. Gichuru, Soil Fertility/Agronomy 
Dr. 0. Ndoye, Agricultural Economics 
Dr. D. Baker, Agricultural Economics 
Dr. I. Riviere, Crop Ecology (Post Dot.) 
ICRAF/IRA. Yaounde 
Dr. J. Ayuk-Takem, Director, IRA 
Dr. B. Duguma, ICRAF Team Leader 
Dr. D.O. Ladipo, ICRAF Tree Breeder 
ICRAF (Team Visiting from ICRAF Has. Nairobi) 
Dr. R. Leakey, Director of Research 
Dr. P. Cooper, Coordinator, Systems Improvement 
Dr. Anne-Maria Izac, Coordinator, Characterization and Impact Analysis 
7. GHANA (25-27 August 1994) 
Ministrv of Agriculture, Accra 
Dr. A.K. Musi, Director, Animal Production Department 
Dr. F. Ofori, Crops Services Extension Department 
Dr. S. Korang-Amoakah, Director, Crops Services 
CSIR. Accra 
Prof. K. Haizel, Senior Technical Advisor 
Mr. Byneth, Aquatic Biology Institute 
Dr. S. 0. Bennett-Lartey, Plant Genetic Resources Institute 
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CRI, Kumasi 
Dr. Seth A.K. Ashiamah, Training Officer, Training & Communication Unit 
Dr. Samuel A. Peporah, Resource and Crops Management Division 
Dr. Joseph Adjei, Legumes Division 
Dr. Isaac 0.0. Ansah, Training, Communication & Printing Unit 
Dr. J.Y. Asibuo, On-Farm Research 
Dr. K.M. Adu, Plant Breeding, Legumes 
Dr. Joyce Haleegoah, Socioeconomics Division 
Dr. Florence Ansere-Brah, Socioeconomics Division 
Dr. K.O. Adu-Tutu, Weed Scientist 
GAMBIA (2830 August 1994) 
ITC. Baniul 
Prof. L. Dempfle, Director General 
Dr. B. Touray , Deputy Director General 
Dr. S. Osaer 
Dr. B. Goossens, Veterinarian 
Dr. D.J. Clifford 
Dr. R.C. Mattioli 
Dr. M. Kassama 
Dr. S. Kora 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (8 September 1994) 
IFPRI Washington, DC 
Dr. Ousmane Badiane, Research Fellow 
Dr. Dean A. DeRosa, Research Fellow 
Dr. Chris Delgado, Research Fellow 
Dr. J. Hopkins, Research Fellow 
Dr. C. Farrar, Director of Administration and Finance 
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John McIntire 
John McIntire is a Senior Agricultural Economist at the World Bank where he has worked 
on agricultural and rural development and reform in Mexico, Central America and 
Bangladesh. Dr. McIntire worked on technology assessment and livestock policy analysis 
for ICRISAT and ILCA for nearly 10 years in Africa before joining the Word Bank. He 
was’ a consultant to the Third External Programme and Management Review of ICARDA 
and a member of the CGIAR Livestock Research Steering Committee. 
Bakary Ouayogode 
Bakary Ouayogode is Director of Research Programmes and Training at the Ministry of 
Scientific Research Technology and Professional Training, Republic of C&e d’Ivoire. He 
commenced his research career as an entomologist at IDESSA, Bouake, rising to the 
position of Chief of the Division of Plant Protection. He was a representative of the 
Imperial Chemical Industries, Plant Protection Division for Central and West 
Francophone Africa. He participated in the IITA External Grain Legumes Programme 
Review and was a member of the Second External Programme and Management Review 
of ISNAR. 
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GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS 
CFA 



















Communitc Financiere Africaine 
Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research 
Comite Permanent Inter-Ctats de Lutte contre la Secheresse dans le 
Sahel 
Centro International de Mejoramiento de Maiz y Trigo 
Centro International de la Papa 
Centre de Cooperation Internationale en Recherche Agronomique 
pour le Dcveloppement 
Centre International de Recherche-Developpement sur 1’Elevage en 
Zone Subhumide 
Conference des Responsables de la Recherche Agronomique 
Africains 
Collaborative Study of Cassava in Africa 
Gross Domestic Product 
Gross National Product 
Humid Zone of Lowland West Africa 
Institute of Agricultural Research (Nigeria) 
Institute of Agricultural Research and Training (Nigeria) 
International Agricultural Research Center 
International Center for Research in the Dry Areas 
International Center for Living Aquatic Resources Management 
International Center for Research in Agroforestry 
International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics 
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International Food Policy Research Institute 
International Irrigation Management Institute 
International Institute of Tropical Agriculture 
International Livestock Center for Africa 
International Laboratory for Research on Animal Diseases 
International Livestock Research Institute 
International Network for the Improvement of Banana and Plantain 
Institut National de Recherches Agronomique du Burkina Faso 
Institut National de Recherches Agronomique du Niger 
Institut du Sahel 
International Plant Genetic Resources Institute 
Institut des Recherches Agronomiques 
ICRISAT Sahelian Center 
International Service for National Agricultural Research 
International Trypanotolerance Center 
International Rice Research Institute 
Medium-Term Plan 
National Animal Products Research Institute (Nigeria) 
National Agricultural Research System 
Semi-Arid Food Grains Research and Development 
Semi-Arid Lowland of West Africa 
Semi-Arid Tropics 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
Technical Advisory Committee of the CGIAR 
West Africa Rice Development Association 
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